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BETTER COMPETITION ADVOCACY
MAURICE E. STUCKEt

INTRODUCTION

Competition authorities from around the world disagree over
substantive and procedural issues, such as the standard
for anticompetitive unilateral conduct.
But one undisputed
topic is competition advocacy.1 Competition advocacy, as that
term is commonly used, targets potentially anticompetitive
governmental regulations or protections. 2 These governmental
t Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. A.B., J.D.
Georgetown University. The author wishes to thank Kenneth Davidson, William
Kovacic, Don Leatherman, Mae Catherine Quinn, D. Daniel Sokol, Gregory Stein,
Harry Stucke, and Spencer Weber Waller for their helpful comments, and the
University of Tennessee College of Law for its summer research grant. The author
was previously an attorney at the United States Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division.
1 The International Competition Network ("ICN") in 2002 adopted the following
definition of competition advocacy: "Competition advocacy refers to those activities
conducted by the competition authority related to the promotion of a competitive
environment for economic activities by means of non-enforcement mechanisms,
mainly through its relationship with other governmental entities and by increasing
public awareness of the benefits of competition." ADVOCACY WORKING GROUP,
INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK, ADVOCACY AND COMPETITION POLICY REPORT

25 (2002), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/OutreachToolkit/media/
assets/resources/advocacy-report.pdf [hereinafter ICN ADVOCACY REPORT]. Formed

in 2001 by antitrust agencies from fourteen jurisdictions, the ICN is an
"international body devoted exclusively to competition law enforcement."
International Competition Network: About the ICN, http://international
competitionnetwork.org/index.php/en/about-icn (last visited Mar. 30, 2008). Its
membership is "open to all national or multinational competition authorities
entrusted with the enforcement of a competition law." International Competition
Network: Join the ICN, http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.php/en/
get-involved/join-the-icn (last visited Mar. 30, 2008). It currently has one hundred
competition agency members from eighty-eight jurisdictions, including the U.S.
Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC").
2 As a former Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the DOJ stated,
But it is equally critical that antitrust enforcement not become a
bureaucratic obstacle to efficient business conduct and that antitrust
enforcers not unnecessarily regulate-and thereby stifle-the competitive
forces we mean to protect. Antitrust agencies must also work to nurture
and strengthen a culture of competition within their economies and to
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regulations include insulating German economists,3 Italian
hairstylists, 4 and Kentucky real estate agents 5 from competition.
As its former chairman stated, the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") has secured many victories with its competition advocacy
efforts over the past few decades and has "largely won the
intellectual debate." 6
His successor similarly stressed the
advocate wherever necessary the importance of freeing consumers in
competitive markets from overly burdensome regulation.
William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, A Culture of Competition for North America, Address at "Economic
Competition Day: Shared Experiences" 2 (June 24, 2002), http://www.usdoj
gov/atr/public/speeches/11351.pdf [hereinafter 2002 Kolasky Address, A Culture of
Competition].
3 Germany recently abolished its fifty-seven year old ritual of exclusively relying
on five German economic research institutions to predict growth and advise on
economic policy. These five institutions were paid $1.7 million for their biannual
projections. The government officials said that more competition would keep the
economists at these five think-tanks "on their toes." Hugh Williamson, Rivals Move
in on Germany's Cosy Think-Tank Club, FIN. TIMES (London), May 1, 2007, at 7.
4 Italy's center-left government sought to introduce more competition to heavily
protected professions and services by abolishing rules "governing who can do what
job, where and when." Regulations limiting the number of bakeries in a given Italian
city were dropped, and at least 500 new shops opened. Non-prescription drugs, once
the domain of pharmacies, are now sold in 800 outlets, including the French
hypermarket Carrefour. Supermarkets can now sell petrol; banks can no longer
penalize homeowners for paying off their mortgages early. Hairdressers can now
work on Mondays, and decide if and when they will close during the week. Cinemas
need not be a minimum distance from each other. There will no longer be caps on the
number of tourist guides or any residency requirements. Pierangelo Raineri, General
Secretary of Fisascat, a union representing tourism industry workers, said: "This
risks pushing qualified and specialist professionals out of the market and leaving
customers at the mercy of anyone who decides to define himself as a tourist guide."
Tony Barber & Adrian Michaels, Italy's Bastions of Protection and Privilege Resist
Liberal Assault, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 2, 2007, at 7; see also Tony Barber &
Adrian Michaels, In for a Trim-An Italy Anxious for Growth Tries To Stimulate
Competition, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 28, 2007, at 15.
5 See United States v. Ky. Real Estate Comm'n, No. 3:05-cv-00188-S, Am. Final
J. at 5-6, 8 (W.D. Ky. July 15, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f210100/210142.
pdf.
6 Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Creating a Culture of
Competition: The Essential Role of Competition Advocacy, Prepared Remarks Before
the ICN Panel on Competition Advocacy and Antitrust Authorities (Sept. 28, 2002),
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/020928naples.shtm.
Two
FTC
economists
characterized the agencies' earlier experience of competition advocacy as
"disappointing." A.E. Rodriguez & Mark D. Williams, The Effectiveness of Proposed
Antitrust Programs for Developing Countries, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 209,
229-30 (1994). "The agencies are almost never asked to comment on proposed
legislation" and "suffer political pressure from above, from the President and
Congress, who both are lobbied by producer interest groups, to limit their advocacy
roles." Id.
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dangers of government institutions displacing competition, and
praised the FTC's "increasingly active" competition advocacy
7
program.
This Article recognizes that certain governmental restraints
diminish competition and deserve censure.
The competition
agencies should continue to inform the legislative debate of a
proposed governmental measure's likely anticompetitive effects.8
But the prevailing competition advocacy glosses over four
fundamental questions: First, what is competition? Second,
what are the goals of a competition policy? Third, how does one
achieve, if one can, the objectives of such desired competition?
Fourth, how does one know if the economy is progressing toward
these goals?
Many have criticized government restraints and praised
competition advocacy; few have critically examined competition
advocacy from this broader viewpoint. This examination is
important for several reasons. First, although some United
States competition officials have remarked that the intellectual
debate is over, many countries that are creating their
competition regulatory and enforcement bodies are asking these
questions, and the answers are not self-evident. 9 Countries can
7 Deborah Platt Majoras, State Intervention: A State of Displaced Competition,
13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1175, 1178 (2006). The federal antitrust agencies' advocacy
efforts at times have engendered congressional hostility. See Federal Trade
Commission Authorization: Hearing on H.R. 2897 Before the Subcomm. on
Transportation, Tourism, and Hazardous Materials of the Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 100th Cong. (1987); James C. Cooper et al., The Theory and Practice of
Competition Advocacy at the FTC, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1091, 1092, 1104 (2005).
8 For example, the FTC filed comments with the Texas State Bar concerning
online attorney matching services, designed to help consumers find attorneys who
can handle their legal needs. The Professional Ethics Committee was considering
whether its ethical rules prohibited attorneys from participating in such online legal
matching services. The FTC commented on the value of the services in reducing
consumers' search costs for finding legal representation and its potential to increase
competition among attorneys. At the same time, the FTC staff saw "no indication
that consumers are likely to suffer harm from online legal matching services that
would justify banning them." Letter from the Fed. Trade Comm'n to W. John Glancy,
Chairman, Profl Ethics Comm. for the State Bar of Tex. (May 26, 2006),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/05VO60017CommentsonaRequestforAn
EthicsOpinionImage.pdf. The state bar permitted lawyers to participate provided
that the requirements in the opinion were met. Profl Ethics Comm. for the State
Bar of Tex., Op. 573 (2006), http://www.legalmatch.com/attorneys/company/texasopinion-573.pdf. For the FTC's advocacy filings, see Federal Trade Commission,
Advocacy Filings, http://www.ftc.govlbe/advofile.shtm (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).

9 See, e.g., CUTS CENTRE FOR COMPETITION, INV. & ECON. REGULATION,
TOWARDS A HEALTHY
COMPETITION
CULTURE... (2003),
http://www.cuts-
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rally around consensus-building (though meaningless) goals such
as "protecting the competitive process" or "promoting efficiency."
Despite the consensus on a loosely defined competition advocacy,
there is no consensus domestically or internationally among the
growing number of competition authorities on the definition of
competition, the goals of competition policy, or whether such
goals are an end or the means to some higher end.
Second, competition authorities here and abroad conflate the
goals of antitrust enforcement with the goals of competition
generally. They need not, nor should not, be the same. Antitrust
enforcement is bound by the rule of law. Enforcers or the courts
cannot rank antitrust's multiple social goals based on their
ideology, by prosecuting only bad cartels (bid-rigging on milk)
versus good cartels (cigarette manufacturers, where a reduction
in output may be desirable). On the other hand, competition
authorities must engage other institutional stakeholders on how
competition policy interacts with, is inconsistent with, or
subsumes other social goals.
Third, the prevailing United States competition advocacy
assumes competition as a "self-initiating process" that evolves on
its own accord, which the federal, state, or local agencies can
inhibit, but not necessarily improve.
Rather than a selfinitiating, self-correcting sphere independent of the government,
competition may be an open, complex process whereby firms
interact with government and informal institutions.
The
government thus plays a key role in providing or promoting the
necessary institutions for these markets to remain or become
competitive. As economies evolve, the government must provide
the necessary institutions to support this complexity. Rather
than a moral dualism where exogenous government forces are
bad and self-initiating free market forces are good, governmental
and private forces instead may interact to provide the necessary
infrastructure for that economy to flourish-for example,
institutions that assist in defining and protecting property rights.
Absent this examination, competition policy at best may be
incomplete, and at worst self-defeating with its simplistic view of
the competitive process and the evils of government.

international.org/THC.pdf [hereinafter CUTS]; Robert H. Lande, Professor Waller's
Un-American Approach to Antitrust, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 137, 138 (2000)
[hereinafter Lande, Professor Waller's Un-American Approach to Antitrust].
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Part I of this Article outlines the conventional wisdom
underlying today's competition advocacy. Part II examines what
is meant by competition, and what is being valued. Part III
examines the goals of competition, as expressed by various
governmental agencies.
Part IV examines the structural
mechanisms that the government can provide to help achieve the
competition goals. Market failure may have numerous causes,
both public and private, and may be caused not only by
governmental action, such as an anticompetitive regulation, but
by governmental inaction, such as the lack of well-defined land
titling institutions to ensure that property rights are easily
transferred. Part V concludes with several signposts to gauge
whether United States competition policy is progressing toward
its goals.
I.

CONVENTIONAL COMPETITION ADVOCACY-KEEPING THE
GOVERNMENT OUT

As part of their advocacy initiatives, the Department of
Justice ("DOJ") and the FTC typically (1) "eliminate unnecessary
and costly existing government regulation," (2) "inhibit the
growth of unnecessary new regulation," (3) "minimize the
competitive distortions caused where regulation is necessary by
advocating the least anticompetitive form of regulation
consistent with the valid regulatory objectives," and (4) "ensure
that regulation is properly designed to accomplish legitimate
regulatory objectives."1 0 They attempt to inform lawmakers of
the proposed legislation's likely anticompetitive effects before
such legislation is enacted. Because of the implied immunity
under the state action doctrine, once such laws are passed, the
federal antitrust agencies are limited in remedying the ensuing
anticompetitive results.
The "effective competition advocacy
program by a committed and independent competition authority
will encourage the greatest scope for allowing markets to allocate
resources, thereby improving productivity and economic growth
to the benefit of consumers."1 1 The DOJ, for example, advocated
competition in the real estate industry,1 2 to state legislators and
10 2002 Kolasky Address, A Culture of Competition, supra note 2, at 8.
11 Id. at 9.
12 See FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION IN THE REAL
ESTATE BROKERAGE INDUSTRY (2007), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/reports/

223094.pdf. For additional antitrust background on competition in the real estate
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bar associations to permit non-lawyers to compete for certain
services, 13 to Congress to repeal its exemption for shipping
monopolies in our Shipping Act, 14 and to other federal
governmental
agencies,
such as
the
Department
of
Transportation and the Federal Maritime Commission. 15 Despite
the DOJ's and FTC's efforts, at times, anticompetitive laws are
enacted.
The agencies' second effort is to limit such
anticompetitive conduct to its narrowly-defined immunity and
exception.1 6 Otherwise, if left unchecked, activities done under
the cloak of immunity may sprawl to non-immunized activities,
especially when the standard for immunity is imprecise, with
differing-at
times
inconsistent-interpretations.
The
competition agencies' third effort is to encourage the revocation
or modification of anticompetitive laws, regulations, or
judgments. The DOJ, for example, approached the handful of
states that ban rebates and discounts for real estate brokerage
services, and
some states thereafter
rescinded their
17
regulations.
anticompetitive
industry, see generally NORMAN W. HAWKER, AM. ANTITRUST INST., COMPETITION IN
THE RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE INDUSTRY: A SUMMARY OF THE AAI
SYMPOSIUM (2006), http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/535.pdf.
13 See, e.g., Press Release, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice
Department and FTC Urge Rhode Island Legislature To Continue Allowing
Nonlawyers To Close Real Estate Deals (Apr. 1, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/2003/April/03 at_203.htm.
14 See The Free Market Antitrust Immunity Reform Act of 2001: Hearingon H.R.
1253 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of
Charles A. James, Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div. of the U.S. Dep't of Justice),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/l1244.pdf.
15 See Comments of the U.S. Dep't of Justice to the Fed. Mar. Comm'n on the
Petition of the United Parcel Serv. for an Exemption Pursuant to Section 16 of the
Shipping Act of 1984 to Permit Negotiation, Entry and Performance of Serv.
Contracts, Petition
No. P3-03 (Oct. 10, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/comments/201372.pdf. The Federal Maritime Commission responded by
enacting the exemption for which the DOJ advocated. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n NonVessel-Operating Common Carrier Service Arrangements, 46 C.F.R. pt. 531 (2008).
16 See, e.g., Chi. Profl Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667,
671-72 (7th Cir. 1992) ('"Vhen special interests claim that they have obtained favors
from Congress, a court should ask to see the bill of sale" and should "read exceptions
to the antitrust laws narrowly, with beady eyes and green eyeshades.").
17 See Press Release, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, South Dakota Real
Estate Commission Permits Real Estate Brokers To Offer Rebates and Inducements:
Rescission of Rulings Will Benefit Consumers of Real Estate Services
(Aug. 17, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2005/210637.htm;
Press Release, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, West Virginia Real Estate
Commission Permits Real Estate Brokers To Offer Rebates and Other Discounts:
Rescission of Regulation Will Benefit Consumers of Real Estate Services (May 4,
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This approach to competition advocacy is consistent with the
Chicago School's view of removing or minimizing governmental
restraints on the free market.' 8 Competition is assumed to be "a
self-initiating process," which, when left alone by government
regulators, will generally allocate resources efficiently toward
users who value them the most. 19 Any company's attempt to
secure or maintain market power would likely be defeated by
other well-informed profit maximizers, either new entrants or
existing competitors. Under the Chicago School's assumptions,
are
competitive,
mergers
and vertical
most markets
arrangements often create efficiencies, and market forces will
20
likely redress any attempt to exercise market power.
The government, under this theory, operates outside the free
market, 21 and must justify the necessity of its intervening and
"displacing" competition. Any suggestion to improve or manage

2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/opalpr/2006/May/06-at-274.html.
18 As Antitrust Modernization Commissioner and now University of Chicago
Professor Dennis W. Carlton wrote, the FTC and DOJ economists and lawyers
"should be, but are not always, used effectively as a resource by other federal and
local government agencies for structuring regulations in a way so as to not interfere
too much with the competitive process." ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

401

(2007), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/

report-recommendationlamc..final-report.pdf [hereinafter AMC REPORT].
19 UNILATERAL CONDUCT WORKING GROUP, INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK,
REPORT ON THE OBJECTIVES OF UNILATERAL CONDUCT LAWS, ASSESSMENT OF
DOMINANCE/SUBSTANTIAL MARKET POWER, AND STATE-CREATED MONOPOLIES 29

(2007),
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/unilateral[hereinafter
conduct/Objectives%20of%20Unilateral%20Conduct%2OMay%2007.pdf
2007 ICN REPORT]. As the Antitrust Division's manual states: "[R]egulation can be
an imperfect and very costly substitute for 'regulation' by market forces.
Accordingly, exceptions to the general rule of free market competition, protected by
antitrust enforcement, should be permitted only on compelling evidence that
competition cannot work or is inimical to some overriding social objective." U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL ch. V, http://www.usdoj.gov/tr/foia
divisionmanua1ch5.htm#ch5 (last visited Mar. 30, 2008) [hereinafter DOJ MANUAL].
20 A former head of the DOJ's Antitrust Division during the Reagan
Administration, and now Circuit Court Judge for the District of Columbia, argued
for "an enforcement policy that resolves close cases in favor of nonintervention," and
stated that a civil rule of reason enforcement action will "rarely be justified."
Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Appropriate Role of the Antitrust Enforcement Agencies, 9
CARDOZO L. REV. 1277, 1280, 1282 (1988). Market forces "are, after all, selfcorrecting in the long run." Id. at 1280. But Keynes' popular refrain is that "this long
run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead." JOHN
MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM ch. 3 (MacMillian & Co. 1923)

(emphasis omitted).
21 Rodriguez & Williams, supra note 6, at 216 n.34 (stating that economists
"traditionally viewed government policy as an exogenous dues-ex-machina").
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competition smacks of socialism and industrial policy. Antitrust
law "does not authorize the government (or any private party) to
seek to 'improve' competition. Instead, antitrust enforcement
22
seeks to deter or eliminate anticompetitive restraints."
Government intervention should be limited to clear and
sustained instances of market failure, of which "only explicit
price fixing and very larger horizontal mergers (mergers to
monopoly) [are] worthy of serious concern." 23 For some, even
then, the government must proceed with caution.
The
spontaneous free market forces eventually will defeat, through
expansion or de novo entry, this temporary market power. In
attempting to preempt this exercise of market power, the
government may chill pro-competitive behavior. 2 4 The concern is
that unlike market-created impediments, market forces may not
readily overcome these government-imposed impediments to
competition.2 5 The greater concern of governmental intervention
22 AMC REPORT, supra note 18, at 3.
23 Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.

REV. 925, 933 (1979) [hereinafter Posner, Chicago School]; see also 2007 ICN
REPORT, supra note 19, at 29; Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84
MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1701 (1986). This view is not unique to the Chicago School, but

is the core of neoclassical economic theory with its "faith in non-intervention by
government in the economic process as a general principle and in only limited
intervention in practice." William M. Dugger, Two Twists in Economic Methodology:
Positivism & Subjectivism, 42 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 75, 75 (1983).
24 See Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 1287 ("It is rare indeed that government
intervention, except the repeal of some prior misstep, will improve the performance
of a market.").
25 As a former head of the DOJ's Antitrust Division stated:
Government-imposed restraints on competition are an area where
competition authorities need to act.... Competitors often are under
challenge from new forms of competition, perhaps through the Internet.
The first place that many competitors will go for help is to the government.
A government-imposed impediment is the one type of market competition
impediment that the market will never be able to correct by itself. Earlier,
one of our panelists emphasized that governments have a monopoly on this
type of action and when they act, there is no possibility for market selfcorrection. We need to be aware of competitors seeking help of this kind in
our own enforcement activities. Sometimes competitors will try to get
governments to act in ways that do not promote competition, but instead
promote their private interest as a competitor. We must be wary of
government decisions or actions that restrain competition.
R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Competition and Politics, Remarks at the 12th International Conference on
Competition in Bonn, Germany 7-8 (June 6, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/speeches/210522.pdf. Similarly, the FTC in describing its competition
advocacy efforts wrote that "[e]xperience has shown that government-imposed
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lies with the risk of false positives, which can chill procompetitive market behavior and which market forces cannot
readily redress, than false negatives, which entry or expansion
eventually
corrects.
Coinciding
with
the
Reagan
Administration's view of governmental institutions as a
necessary evil, 26 competition advocacy underscores how
government interference likely causes greater harm, in inhibiting
the market's efficient allocation of scarce resources, than good.
Consequently, the debate among some neoclassical economists is
whether the government should intervene at all.
Operating under this conventional wisdom, the competition
advocacy literature typically: (1) highlights the evils of
government restraints, such as protecting Italian barbers or
Kentucky real estate brokers from the gales of competition;
(2) focuses on procedural issues, such as when and how the
competition agency can intervene in the legislative process to
prevent such evils 27 and the extent to which newer competition
agencies should devote resources to competition advocacy versus
antitrust enforcement; 28 and (3) takes a few whacks at
immunities and exemptions to the competition laws, such as the
29
state action doctrine.

restrictions are among the most effective and durable constraints on competition."
FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE FTC IN 2007: A CHAMPION FOR CONSUMERS AND
COMPETITION 18 (2007), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/O4/ChairmansReport2OO7.pdf.
The FTC similarly focuses on "limit[ing] or eliminat[ing]" anticompetitive "public
impediments" on competition. Id.
26 As President Reagan told the nation, "government is not the solution to our
problem; government is the problem." Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address (Jan.
20, 1981), http://www.reaganlibrary.com/reagan/speeches/first.asp.
27 See ICN ADVOCACY REPORT, supra note 1, at vi-vii. Based on its survey of
competition agencies, the ICN found three key factors likely to affect the
effectiveness of competition advocacy: First is whether authorities are informed in a
timely manner. Second is the "compulsory or non-compulsory status of the
consultation," such as whether competition agencies can undertake the advocacy on
their own initiative or only after being requested by another governmental agency
for comments or recommendations. The third factor is the "degree of bindingness of
the recommendations made." Id. at 59.
28 See id. at iii.
29 See, e.g., Majoras, supra note 7, at 1179-80. One antitrust scholar, however,
has questioned some of the conventional wisdom concerning competition advocacy
and its applicability to developing countries. See Simon J. Evenett, Competition
Advocacy: Time for a Rethink?, 26 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 495 (2006) (arguing for
further analysis of which forms of competition advocacy are more successful, why
such advocacy works, and the benefits that flow from it).
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Indeed, such governmental restraints can have several
harms. For example, at the DOJ, I prosecuted a regulatory ban
on discounts, in the form of rebates and inducements, in
connection with real estate brokerage services. 30
First,
consumers pay more for the products or services in that industry.
A second harm is that such "rent-seeking" behavior can impose
additional social costs. Economic regulation attracts special
interest groups to lobby the government for regulatory measures
that benefit them to the detriment of society overall. 31 Thus,
competitors, when challenged by new rivals or new forms of
competition, may turn to government regulators for help.
Competitors may ask federal, state, and local agencies under the
guise of consumer protection to prohibit or restrict certain procompetitive activity, such as allowing professionals to offer
discounts to their clients. They may enlist the government to
increase trade barriers or for other protectionist measures. 32
30 Complaint at 12, United States v. Ky. Real Estate Comm'n, No. 3:05CV188-H
(W.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f208300/208393.pdf. The
Commonwealth of Kentucky had created the Kentucky Real Estate Commission "to
regulate the licensing and education of [real estate b]rokers and to safeguard and
protect the public interest." Id. at 2. The Commission's Board, which was composed
overwhelmingly of real estate brokers, id. at 4, introduced a regulation prohibiting
brokers licensed in Kentucky from offering their customers rebates or inducements,
id. at 7-8. A real estate broker might offer a home buyer a cash rebate, such as
$1,000, or an inducement, like a free television, if the buyer used that broker. This
ban on discounting was anticompetitive. Indeed, if the real estate brokers secretly
agreed to eliminate such discounts, they likely faced criminal fines and
incarceration. Instead, the brokers went to the state commission, whose board is
overwhelmingly composed of realtors, and got them to pass this regulation banning
such discounts.
31 ICN ADVoCACY REPORT, supra note 1, at ii.
32 "Cross-country and cross-industry studies of industrial and developing
countries have found evidence that industries in decline, industries that are highly
unionized, and industries that make substantial campaign contributions all tend to
be rewarded with higher tariff protection." WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT

REPORT 2002: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS 105 (2002), available at

http://www.worldbank.org/wdr/20O1/fulltext/fulltext2OO2.htm. Likewise, the former
FTC Chairwoman noted that much of the agency's competition advocacy "involves
commenting on state and federal regulations or legislation that erect barriers to
entry." Deborah Platt Majoras, The Federal Trade Commission: Learning From
History as We Confront Today's Consumer Challenges, 75 U. MO.-KAN. CITY L. REV.
115, 124 (2006). Concentrated markets can be competitive if contestable. "In
Canada, for example, where the five largest banks [control] 80 percent of all banking
assets, researchers have found no evidence of monopolistic behavior." WORLD BANK,
supra, at 88. Similarly, analysis of bank-level data from eighty countries showed
that concentration had little effect on bank profitability or margins. On the other
hand, another study cited by the World Bank indicated that tighter restrictions on
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They may seek from the legislature or courts immunities from
the
competition
laws. 33
As
a testament
to such
35
34
special interest legislation, the DOJ Manual cites agriculture,
export activities,3 6 insurance,3 7 labor, 38 fishing, 39 defense
entry into banking were associated with higher average interest rate margins and
overhead expenditures. The study found that "[a]dditional restrictions on foreign
entrants [were] associated with lower sector portfolio quality and greater likelihood
of a banking crisis." Id.
33 As the ICN noted: "Virtually every jurisdiction has exemptions from anticartel laws, either in connection with regulation of an industry or because a
legislative choice has been made not to apply antitrust laws to certain conduct or
industries." WORKING GROUP ON CARTELS, INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK, DEFINING
HARD-CORE CARTEL CONDUCT: EFFECTIVE INSTITUTIONS, EFFECTIVE PENALTIES 13

(2005), available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/
conference_4th bonn_2005/Effective_Anti-CartelRegimesBuildingBlocks.pdf.
34 See DOJ MANUAL, supra note 19, at ch. II, pt. C.
35 Cooperative Marketing Association (Capper-Volstead) Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92
(2000) (allowing persons engaged in the production of agricultural products to act
together for purpose of "collectively processing, preparing for market, handling, and
marketing" their products and permitting cooperatives to have "marketing agencies
in common"); Cooperative Marketing Act, 7 U.S.C. § 455 (2000) (authorizing
agricultural producers and associations to acquire and exchange "past, present, and
prospective" pricing, production, and marketing data); Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. § 608-08c (2000) (providing the U.S. Secretary of
Agriculture authority to enter into (1) marketing agreements with producers and
processors of agricultural commodities, and (2) marketing orders, except for milk,
that control amount of an agricultural product reaching the market and thus serve
to enhance the price); 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2000) (permitting, inter alia, operation of
agricultural or horticultural mutual assistance organizations when such
organizations do not have capital stock or are not conducted for profit).
36 Export Trade (Webb-Pomerene) Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (2000) (providing
antitrust immunity for the formation and operation of associations of otherwise
competing businesses, allowing them to engage in collective export sales that do not
extend to actions that have an anticompetitive effect within the United States or
that injure domestic competitors of members of export associations); Export Trading
Company Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-20 (2000) (permitting limited antitrust
immunity for export trade, export trade activities, and methods of operation
specified in certificate of review issued by Secretary of Commerce with Attorney
General's concurrence).
37 See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (2000) (exempting from
antitrust laws the "business of insurance" to the extent "regulated by [s]tate law").
38 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2000) (providing that 'labor of a human being is not a
commodity or article of commerce" and that the Act permits labor organizations to
carry out their legitimate objectives); 29 U.S.C. § 52 (2000) (immunizing collective
activity by employees relating to disputes concerning terms or conditions of
employment); Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-10, 113-15 (2000)
(providing that U.S. courts do not have jurisdiction to issue restraining orders or
injunctions against certain union activities on the basis that such activities
constitute unlawful combination or conspiracy under antitrust laws).
39 Fishermen's Collective Marketing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 521-22 (2000) (permitting
"persons engaged in the fishing industry, as fishermen... [to] act together ... in
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preparedness, 40 newspapers, 4 1 professional sports, 4 2 small
business joint ventures, 43 and local governments, 44 as enjoying
limited or general statutory immunity from the federal antitrust
laws. Such "rent-seeking" behavior, while beneficial to lobbyists
and lawyers, may lead to a substantial waste of scarce resources,
and is condemned by the Chicago School, post-Chicago, and nonChicago commentators. 45
In the Kentucky Real Estate
collectively catching, producing, preparing for market, processing, handling, and

marketing" their products).
40

Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 App. U.S.C. § 2158 (2000) (providing that

the President or his delegate, in conjunction with the Attorney General, may
approve voluntary agreements among various industry groups for development of
"preparedness programs" to meet potential national emergencies). The Act further
provides that persons participating in such an agreement are immunized from the
operation of antitrust laws with respect to good faith activities undertaken to fulfill
their responsibilities under agreement. Id.
41 Newspaper Preservation Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04 (2000) (granting
limited exemption for joint operating arrangements between newspapers to share
production facilities and combine commercial operations, provided that newspapers
retain separate editorial and reporting staffs, determine their editorial policies
independently, and so long as one newspaper party to the joint venture is classified
as failing).
42 Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-95 (2000) (exempting, with some
limitations, agreements among professional football, baseball, basketball, and
hockey teams to negotiate jointly, through their leagues, for the sale of television
rights).
43 Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-57 (2000) (granting the Small Business
Administration authority to, after consultation with the Attorney General and the
Chair of the FTC, and with the Attorney General's prior written approval, approve
any agreement between small business firms providing for a joint program of
research and development if the Administrator finds that such program will
"strengthen the free enterprise system and the economy of the Nation"). To the
extent the President has delegated his authority under section 640, the DOJ may
also be asked to approve-on the Attorney General's behalf-proposed voluntary
agreements or programs among small business concerns to further objectives of the
Small Business Act found to be in the public interest as contributing to national
defense.
44 Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (2000) (providing
antitrust immunity for local government officials and employees thereof acting in an
official capacity with respect to actions brought under the Clayton Act for damages,
fees, or costs). The Act provides similar immunity for claims directed at a person, as
that term is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2000), based on official action directed by local
government. See id. § 36.
45 See, e.g., Rodriguez & Williams, supra note 6, at 226 & n.79 (collecting
literature); see also ICN ADVOCAcY REPORT, supra note 1, at ii. One observation in

Washington, D.C., was that Microsoft (before its antitrust headaches) had devoted
little energy in lobbying officials, which left it exposed to the government's antitrust
prosecution. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Learning from Microsoft's Error, Google Builds a
Lobbying Engine, WASH. POST, June 20, 2007, at D01. As the Post commented: "For
a couple of embarrassing years in the mid-1990s, Microsoft's primary lobbying
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Commission case, for example, the social costs included the costs
in promulgating
and
maintaining this anticompetitive
regulation, in educating real estate brokers not to compete by
offering such rebates, and the Commission's costs of policing and
punishing violators who offered rebates. 46 A third harm is that
such anticompetitive laws may impact the effectiveness of
competition policies elsewhere. 47
Some of the corporate
executives in America's electrical price-fixing cases in the 1960s
reported that they were introduced to such price fixing as part of
the federally-approved price-control programs during and after
4
World War II. 8
In addition to the risks of imperfect information and
regulatory.
capture,
the
government
can
undertake
anticompetitive intervention because of weaker incentives to
avoid mistakes than private actors who fully bear the costs of
their mistakes, "political myopia," and the lack of direct
accountability to the public. 49 As Avinash Dixit stated, "there is
no market failure so bad that the U.S. government and political
process could not do even worse." 50
presence was 'Jack and his Jeep'-Jack Krumholz, the software giant's lone in-house
lobbyist, who drove a Jeep Grand Cherokee to lobbying visits." After the DOJ filed
the antitrust lawsuit in 1998, Microsoft "began what was then considered the largest
government-affairs makeover in corporate history" and now has "one of the most
dominating, multifaceted, and sophisticated influence machines around--one that
spends tens of millions a year." Of the twenty-three people working out of Microsoft's
government affairs office in Washington, sixteen are lobbyists. Id.
46 Real estate brokers in Kentucky who advertised such rebates, no matter how
small, were often turned in by fellow brokers. Consequently, not only were
consumers harmed by not being offered discounts, but there are the costs from the
regulatory capture of the Commission, as funds were spent in policing and punishing
such pro-competitive behavior.
47 AMC Commissioner Donald G. Kempf, Jr. asked: "How do you reconcile the
ever increasing demand for higher fines and higher sentences with the free pass to
so much of the price fixing that goes on under the immunities and exemptions?"
Criminal Remedies, Public Hearing Before the Antitrust Modernization
Commission 71 (2005), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission-hearings/
criminal-remedies.htm.
48 Richard Austin Smith, The Incredible Electrical Conspiracy, FORTUNE, Apr.
1961, at 132, 136.
49 Frangois Moreau, The Role of the State in Evolutionary Economics, 28
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 847, 850 (2004).
50 Avinash Dixit, In Honor of Paul Krugman: Winner of the John Bates
Clark Medal, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 173, 182 n.7 (1993). The federal government in turn
may blame state and local governments. Cooper et al., supra note 7, at 1102 n.40
(statement of FTC Chairman Daniel Oliver) ("It is now convincingly argued that
state and local governments create some of the most blatantly anticompetitive
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Thus, competition advocacy and antitrust enforcement unite
under a single banner: promoting efficiency.
Competition
enforcers serve as zealous bouncers: The antitrust enforcers
should hesitate intervening inside the club (the free market) to
attack private restraints-except that some Chicago School
adherents permit intervention in the rare cases of sustained
market failure. But competition enforcers should aggressively
bounce their brethren from entering the club, especially those
government agents seeking to improve the market or help some
patrons at the others' expense. By aggressively keeping these
government agents out, the free market forces will lead to
greater allocative, productive, and dynamic efficiency.
A.

What Is Competition?Reexamining CompetitionAdvocacy

Competition advocacy appears uncontroversial.
For
legislation that condones such naked horizontal restraints on
competition, the quick response is to eliminate the statute and
allow market forces to allocate efficiently goods and services. If
everyone advocated and applied this conception of competition
advocacy, there would be little left to advocate and competition
officials would prosecute cartels and the few mergers to
monopoly.
But upon scrutiny, competition advocacy is not so
straightforward.
First, how does one define competition?
Second, what are the goals of that competition policy? What,
exactly, are we advocating when we advocate competition? Does
competition policy have non-economic or strictly economic
objectives? If the latter, is competition policy concerned about
total welfare or consumer welfare? Are these objectives an end or
the means to some greater end? Third, how does one achieve
these goals? This depends on our understanding of the various
conditions that are the most favorable to achieving the objectives
of competition. 51 What role does the government play? Is the
government an exogenous force that often distorts competitive
forces?
Or does an effective competitive system need "an
intelligently
designed
and
continuously
adjusted
legal
framework[?]"52 For a competitive market to remain competitive
combinations to be found in the economy.").
61 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM: TEXT AND
DOCUMENTS 71 (Bruce Caldwell ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 2007).
52 Id. at 88.
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may require not only the basic legal institutions, such as the rule
of law, contract and property rights, and transparent efficient
courts, but additional institutions, such as a competitive and
independent media. Informal social norms may support or
hinder the attainment of these competition goals, such as norms
that create entry barriers based on gender, race, age, sexual
orientation, or religion. If so, government action or inaction is
much more nuanced than under the Chicago School's dogma and
can be evil, good, or amoral.
Why not focus on the
Why delve into these issues?
straightforward government restraints that prevent Italian
barbers from cutting hair on Monday or Kentucky real estate
agents from offering a photo with Santa as an inducement?
Advocating competition is meaningless if your audience does not
share your conception of competition or its objectives. Moreover,
viewing competition as a self-initiating force that ultimately
attains a stable equilibrium may be wrong. Competition is far
more complex and dynamic, and the proper focus may not be
short-term efficiencies or even price, but fostering open markets
to better promote dynamic efficiencies. Competition may also
differ across countries with different political and economic
histories, levels of state ownership, and legal and informal
cultural norms, so the international consensus of "competition
advocacy" may not be such a consensus after all.
Imperfections of Perfect Competition
In advocating competition, one must have some concept of
competition in mind. Despite the passage of the Sherman Act
over a century ago, and the growth of over one hundred
competition authorities worldwide, there is no generally accepted
definition among competition authorities for the term
"competition."
Although central to competition policy and
economic thinking in general, the concept of competition, as John
Vickers recognized, is "one that has taken on a number of
The
interpretations and meanings, many of them vague."5
Chilean Competition Tribunal, for example, recently said, "the
only objective of competition policy is to promote and protect
B.

63 John Vickers, Concepts of Competition, 47 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 1, 3 (1995);

see also Jay B. Barney, Types of Competition and the Theory of Strategy: Toward an
Integrative Framework, 11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 791, 798 (1986) ("Competition... is a
concept that can mean different things at different times to different firms.").

ST. JOHN'S LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 82:951

competition," but then recognized that "one of the main
or to
difficulties is to define legally what 'free competition means,'
54
protected.
be
should
itself
competition
why
articulate
Under neoclassical economic theory, competition in its
perfect form is where "buyers and sellers are so numerous and
well informed that each can act as a price-taker, able to buy or
sell any desired quantity without affecting the market price." 55 A
perfect market assumes transparent prices, highly elastic
demand curves, easy entry and exit, and informed profitmaximizing producers and consumers. Price will equal marginal
cost, and the market will produce the efficient level of outputs
with the most efficient techniques, using the minimum quantity
56
of inputs.
But this economic model cannot serve as the definition of
competition for policy purposes. First, "the real world contains
very few such markets."57 A second problem with the perfect
competition model is that the one market today that closely
approximates it is hardly free of governmental restraints. The
economic model of perfect competition is remarkable in its
But today's
absence of laws, regulations, or norms. 58
approximation of that model, the stock market, can hardly be
described as a "self-initiating process." 59 The securities market is
54 2007 ICN REPORT, supra note 19, at 8. In 2004, when Chile's competition act
was amended, "the executive and legislative powers discussed whether 'free
competition' should be defined more narrowly as a right to participate in economic
activities, a means of promoting economic efficiency, or a means of enhancing
consumer welfare." The legislators, as reported by the ICN, "decided that the
meaning of 'free competition,' that is, an effective competitive process, should be left
to the Tribunal's interpretation, on a case-by-case basis." Id.
55

JOHN BLACK, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 348 (1997); William J. Kolasky,

What Is Competition? A Comparison of U.S. and European Perspectives, 49
ANTITRUST BULL. 29, 31 (2004) [hereinafter Kolasky, What Is Competition?].
56 PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 106-41 (15th ed.
1995).
57

AMC REPORT, supra note 18, at 2.

58 Jean-Luc Gaffard & Michel Qu6r6, What's the Aim for Competition Policy:
Optimizing Market Structure or Encouraging Innovative Behaviors, 16 J.
EVOLUTIONARY ECON. 175, 179 (2006).
59 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw 164 (2d ed. 2001). The behavioral

finance literature has questioned the Efficient Market Hypothesis. As Andrew Lo
observed, "[e]ven after several decades of research and literally thousands of studies,
many published in this journal, economists have not yet reached a consensus about
whether markets-particularly financial markets-are, in fact, efficient." Andrew W.
Lo, The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis: Market Efficiency from an Evolutionary
Perspective, 30 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. (30TH ANNIVERSARY ISSUE 2004) 15, 16 (2004);
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built upon a complex regulatory infrastructure, which in turn
interacts with contract, property, corporate, and banking law.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has "comprehensive
authority," as the Supreme Court recently noted with respect to
IPOs, "to forbid, permit, encourage, discourage, tolerate, limit,
and otherwise regulate virtually every aspect of the practices in
which underwriters engage." 60 Indeed, the Court recently held
that when the securities and antitrust laws were clearly
incompatible to the alleged conduct, the competition laws are
displaced. 61 The Court had little faith in competition laws,
competition policy experts, or even non-experts such as judges or
juries to determine when an IPO commission is excessive:
"[Wlho but the SEC itself could do so with confidence?" 62 Thus,
for a competition policy official, the cruelest irony is that the
Court entrusted price regulation to a bureaucracy far removed
from direct political accountability, which has minimal expertise
in competition policy.
A third problem with the model of perfect competition is its
incompleteness, as it has "little to say about productive and
dynamic efficiency." 63 It is also inconsistent with the popular
conception of competition; Friedrich Hayek noted that
[t]he peculiar nature of the assumptions from which the theory
of competitive equilibrium starts stands out very clearly if we
ask which of the activities that are commonly designated by the
verb "to compete" would still be possible if those conditions were
see also 2 ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard H. Thaler ed., 2005); ROBERT
J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2d ed. 2005); Robert A. Prentice, Chicago

Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV.
1663, 1704-05 nn.208-11 (2003) (citing additional articles); Lynn A. Stout, The
Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP.
L. 635 (2003).
60 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S.Ct. 2383, 2392 (2007).
61 Id. at 2395. The Court reached its holding, despite the federal securities laws'
broad savings clauses that preserve rights and remedies existing outside of the
securities laws. Justice Thomas, dissenting, noted that that the savings clauses
explicitly save the very remedies the Court holds to be impliedly precluded. Id. at
2399 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Of course, if the Court had held differently in
permitting challenges to these securities practices under the federal antitrust laws,
one could argue that the district courts and federal antitrust agencies likewise would
engage in normative judgments removed from the public opinion.
62 Id. at 2395 (majority opinion).
63 Vickers, supra note 53, at 7; see also Douglass C. North, Economic
PerformanceThrough Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 359, 359 (1994) ("Neoclassical theory
is simply an inappropriate tool to analyze and prescribe policies that will induce
development.").
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all satisfied. Perhaps it is worth recalling that, according to Dr.
Johnson, competition is "the action of endeavoring to gain what
another endeavors to gain at the same time." Now, how many
of the devices adopted in ordinary life to that end would still be
open to a seller in a market in which so-called "perfect
competition" prevails? I believe that the answer is exactly none.
Advertising, undercutting, and improving ("differentiating") the
goods or services produced are all excluded by definition"perfect" competition means indeed the absence of all
64
competitive activities.
A fourth shortcoming of the perfectly competitive market is
its anti-democratic stance.
Homogeneity in products and
knowledge is idealized: No individual can affect the market; all
are price takers. There is little incentive to innovate, as price
equals marginal cost. Even in markets not characterized by
perfect competition, the emphasis is on total welfare.
Competitors can readily absorb individuals, fringe firms, and de
novo entrants if greater productive efficiencies ensue. Anyone
can be crushed under the wheel for the sake of the unmeasurable
total welfare. But individuals, fringe firms, and de novo entrants
do matter and can play a far greater role as their creativity and
distinctiveness profoundly alter the industry's future.65
A fifth problem with any idealized market condition is its
dispensability.
The neoclassical economic model of perfect
competition assumes that profit-maximizing market participants
pursue their economic self-interest, with perfect knowledge and
willpower. If these simplistic assumptions of human behavior
were true, then these profit-maximizers' behavior should be easy
to predict. A state planner arguably could model any scenario
using the hypothetical profit-maximizer, and then centrally plan
for the same outcome. There would be no compelling reason to
favor free competition without any government involvement over
a centrally planned economy. It is precisely because of the
complexity and unpredictability of the competitive process, the
imperfections of human knowledge, and the variety of conditions
intrinsic to or affecting markets, such as legal and cultural
norms, technology, production, and service norms, that
necessitate against an ideal market or a centrally planned

64 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 96 (1948).
65 See
The Institutional-EvolutionaryAntitrust Model, 22

C. Mantzavinos,

J.L. & ECON. 273, 276 (2006).

EUR.

2008]

BETTER COMPETITIONADVOCACY

economy.
An inverse relationship exists between the two
concepts:
The greater the infirmities of the assumptions
underlying perfect competition, the less practical a centrally
planned economy becomes.
Indeed the behavioral economics literature has critiqued for
66
decades the "rationality" assumptions as being unrealistic.
Actual firm behavior-characterized as bounded rationalitymay vary. 67 Consumers may react differently, depending on how
the choice is phrased.6 8 Contrary to the neoclassical economic
theory, individuals may elect suboptimal outcomes based on

66 For interesting surveys of the many areas of research by behavioral
economists, see Christine Jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1487 (1998); Prentice, supra note 59, at 1666 n.7. For a
broader survey of literature attacking the conventional economic theories, see
generally ERIC D. BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH: THE RADICAL REMAKING
OF ECONOMICS AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR BUSINESS AND SOCIETY (2007). At the
recent annual meeting of the American Economic Association, the Nobel laureate
George A. Akerlof also questioned the assumptions of human behavior underlying
neoclassical economic theory and called for a greater focus on actual human nature
and the detailed facts of experience. See Louis Uchitelle, EncouragingMore Reality
in Economics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2007, at C1.
67 See B. Verspagen, The Use of Modelling Tools for Policy in Evolutionary

Environments, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND MODELLING IN EVOLUTIONARY
ECONOMICS 19, 22 (A. Faber et al. eds., 2006).
68 One example of such "framing effects" is with respect to credit cards. After
the credit card companies' "No-Discrimination Rule" was abolished, Dutch
merchants could impose surcharges or offer discounts based on how the customer
was going to pay. Suppose the customer has credit cards A, B, and C in her wallet.
Although the customer may be ambivalent about which particular credit card to use
for that transaction, the merchant bears a different cost depending on the credit
card that the customer ultimately takes out of her wallet-for example, on a $1000
transaction, the merchant may net $990, $985, or $980 for transactions with cards
A, B, and C, respectively. The merchant has a strong incentive to steer the customer
to the credit card that costs the merchant the least for that transaction. To
incentivize the customer to use credit card A, which has the lowest interchange fee,
the merchant can (1) impose surcharges for transactions with the higher cost cards,
or (2) offer discounts for transactions with lower cost cards. Under neoclassical
economic theory, the two options are equivalent, and self-interested profitmaximizers should not care whether the option is framed as a discount or surcharge.
In reality, of the consumers surveyed, 74 percent thought it (very) bad if a merchant
asked for a surcharge for using a credit card. But when asked about a merchant
offering a discount, only 49 percent thought it (very) bad, with 22 percent neutral
and 21 percent saying it is a (very) good thing. See ITM RESEARCH, THE ABOLITION
OF THE No-DISCRIMINATION RULE 11-12 (2000), http://ec.europa.eu/comm/
competition/antitrust/cases/29373/studies/netherlands/report.pdf. It is interesting
that over 72 percent of the merchants surveyed were unaware of the rule's abolition,
and 89 percent of the merchants did not surcharge customers. Nine percent of the
merchants offered discounts to customers who paid by different means. Id. at 7-8.
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certain heuristics. 69 Firms, at times, enter markets when
irrational to do so under neoclassical economic theory, and firms,
at other times, do not enter markets when in theory it would be
the profit-maximizing response.
Neither the state nor the
private economic agents are endowed with perfect knowledge, but
70
adopt a "satisficingand adaptive behavior."
Ultimately, competition cannot be an ideal state, such as the
perfectly competitive market with many buyers and sellers, none
of whom individually can affect the market price. Competition
occurs on various dimensions (price, quality, choice, innovation)
across markets with different levels of product differentiation,
entry barriers, transparency, stages of the product life cycle,
demands for technological innovation, and operating at different
levels of efficiency, none of which can be shoe-horned into a
single state of perfect competition.
C.

How Does Competition Work?

Because competition in most industries does not resemble
the model of perfect competition, the first order is to understand
better how actual competition works in particular markets in
particular communities at particular time periods and the
interplay among private institutions, government institutions,
and informal social, ethical, and moral norms. This has been
competition policy's greatest failing.
Understanding the

69

Among these heuristics are

[1] loss aversion (namely having significantly greater concern about losing
a given amount than in the utility of gaining the same amount); [2] the
endowment effect (when we demand much more to give up and sell an
object than what they would be willing to pay to acquire that object);
[3] status quo bias (when the choice of default option impacts the outcome);
[4] framing effects (the way the choice is framed-such as a sure gain or
avoiding a loss-alters the way we decide); [5] availability heuristic (when
we assess the probability of an event by asking whether relevant examples
come readily to mind); [6] representative heuristic (when we ignore the
"base rates and overestimate the correlation between what something
appears to be and what something actually is"); [7] overconfidence bias
(when we believe that good things are more likely (and bad things less
likely) than average to happen to us); and [8] hindsight bias (our tendency
to overestimate the ex ante prediction that we had concerning the
likelihood of an event's occurrence after learning that it actually did occur).
Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate:Antitrust in the Twenty-First
Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 527-28 (2007) [hereinafter Stucke, Behavioral
Economists] (citations omitted).
70 See Moreau, supra note 49, at 851.
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competitive process cannot be arrived at deductively from the
model of a perfectly competitive market composed of selfinterested profit-maximizers, but inductively through empirical
research. As Friedrich Hayek noted over sixty years ago:
The systematic study of the forms of legal institutions which
will make the competitive system work efficiently has been
sadly neglected; and strong arguments can be advanced that
serious shortcomings here, particularly with regard to the law
of corporations and of patents, not only have made competition
work much less effectively than it might have done but have
71
even led to the destruction of competition in many spheres.

When receiving his Nobel Prize in 1992, Ronald H. Coase
raised a similar criticism: "These ex-communist countries are
advised to move to a market economy, and their leaders wish to
do so, but without the appropriate institutions no market
economy of any significance is possible. If we knew more about
our own economy, we would be in a better position to advise
them." 72 Today, we remain ignorant about institutions. 73 The
federal antitrust agencies do not systematically review across
industries how governmental institutions and informal norms
support market activity and promote competition.74 Instead,
antitrust authorities since the Reagan Administration remain
grounded in the Chicago School's simplistic theories deduced
from the model of perfect competition and flawed assumptions of
"rational" profit-maximizing behavior. 75
HAYEK, supra note 51, at 87.
R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV.
713, 714 (1992).
73 See Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock,
Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 595, 595 (2000).
74 The DOJ and FTC occasionally evaluate particular industries, such as in the
1930s when the congressional Temporary National Economic Committee
investigated the state of competition in various industries. As the DOJ later
reported, this empirical analysis was helpful. The factual data from this effort
revealed the urgent need for a vigorous attack on monopoly power and
concentration of economic resources and gave added impetus in 1938 and
subsequently to the effort to reverse or at least check the trend toward
concentration which had prevailed for most of the preceding half century,
and to overcome some of the obstacles to effective enforcement of the
antitrust laws.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
AND CURRENT PROBLEMS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, SUBMITTED TO THE U.S.
SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MONOPOLY 9 (2d Sess. 1952).
75 See Posner, Chicago School, supra note 23, at 928. As Posner admitted, "[i]t is
a curiosity, and a source of regret, that to this day [1979] very few of [one of the
71
72
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Is Competition a Zero-Sum Game?

By undertaking more empirical research, policy makers may
question the assumption of competition as necessarily a zero-sum
game: two tired dogs fighting for the last bone. 76 The winners
monopolize; the losers exit the marketplace or scramble to join
other firms.
This assumption has several implications for competition
policy. First, if the default rule is for competitors to fight,
77
cooperation among competitors is viewed with suspicion.
Second, companies enter markets with the expectation of taking
78
revenues away from competitors to achieve monopoly rents.
Third, in pursuing their economic self-interest, individuals will
often free-ride when confronted with public goods and in the
absence of vertical restraints. 79 Finally, when they conflict,
economic self-interest trumps cooperation.8 0

movement's founders Aaron] Director's ideas have been subjected to systematic
empirical examination." Id. at 931 n.13. Indeed Judge Posner criticized the Harvard
School's fondness of studying competition in particular industries, and discarding
the "powerful simplifications of economic theory... in favor of microscopic
examination of the idiosyncrasies of particular markets." Id. at 931.
76 Professor Stigler described competition as arising "whenever two or more
parties strive for something that all cannot obtain." George J. Stigler, Competition,
in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 531, 531 (John Eatwell et al.

eds., 1987). As the recent FTC Chairwoman said: "To compete effectively, we look for
ways to improve our performance, including taking advantage of a competitor's
weakness." Majoras, supra note 7, at 1178. Spectators come to athletic contests to
cheer for a winner, but even here, a degree of cooperation is required to arrange the
contest. Spectators expect that the winner prevails in this zero-sum game within the
norms of fairness.
77 See Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 407-08 (2004) (expressing concern that compelling negotiation between
competitors may facilitate collusion).
78 The Court surmised that monopolies and the charging of monopoly prices
were "an important element of the free-market system," and the inducement to
"attract] 'business acumen' in the first place." Id. at 407. See Maurice E. Stucke,
Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1116463 (discussing how the Court's
economic assumptions in Trinko are wrong and inconsistent with the Sherman Act's
concerns of monopolies' political, social, and ethical implications).
79 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2715
(2007).
80 See, e.g., George Stigler, Economics or Ethics?, in 2 THE TANNER LECTURES
ON HUMAN VALUES 145, 176 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1981), available at

http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edullectures/documents/stigler8l.pdf ("[When] selfinterest and ethical values with wide verbal allegiance are in conflict[,] [m]uch of the
time, most of the time in fact, the self-interest theory... will win.").
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Although competition has a zero-sum aspect, which is
ascribed to Darwinian survival of the fittest,8 1 one cannot
exclusively rely on this assumption. First, our species' survival
depends upon cooperation and our ability to look beyond narrow
self-interest.8 2 The behavioral economics literature has pointed
to evidence of "strong reciprocity," which entails "a predisposition
to cooperate with others and to punish those who violate the
norms of cooperation, at personal cost, even when it is
implausible to expect that these costs will be repaid either by
others or at a later date."8 3 Distrust and the naked pursuit of
81 Charles Darwin,

who wrote of natural selection, did not introduce this

phrase. Instead, British economist Herbert Spencer wrote: "This survival of the
fittest, which I have here sought to express in mechanical terms, is that which Mr.

Darwin has called 'natural selection,' or the preservation of favoured races in the
struggle for life." HERBERT SPENCER, THE PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY 444 (Univ. Press

of the Pac. 2002).
82 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to
Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
23, 45-46 (1989) (arguing that cultural institutions that promote cooperation are
more likely to endure). Rather than driven by pecuniary self-interest, individuals
may act contrary to their self interest for reason of praise as well as "shame, guilt,
empathy, or sensitivity to social sanction." See Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis,
Origins of Human Cooperation, in

GENETIC AND

CULTURAL EVOLUTION OF

COOPERATION 429, 432-33 (Peter Hammerstein ed., 2003). "Without [these] prosocial
emotions, we would all be sociopaths, and human society would not exist, however
strong the institutions of contract, governmental law enforcement, and reputation."
Id. at 433. Individuals may aspire toward benevolence in accordance with some
religious or social norm of fairness even though such behavior deviates from the
tenets of wealth maximization. Rational choice theory predicts that the dominant
strategy will be to free ride when confronted with a public good. But in public good
experiments, many did not free ride at all, or not to the extent predicted under
rational choice theory: "[P]eople have a tendency to cooperate until experience shows
that those with whom they're interacting are taking advantage of them." RICHARD
H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE

14 (1992). Individuals at times act benevolently when not in their financial interest;
conversely, individuals may sacrifice monetary gains to punish those they feel are
acting unfairly-deviating from an established reference point of what is fair. See
generally Stucke, Behavioral Economists, supra note 69, at 513-18 (discussing the
intersection of antitrust and behavioral economics).
83 Herbert Gintis et al., Explaining Altruistic Behavior in Humans, 24
EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 153, 154 (2003). These authors argue that "the

evolutionary success of our species and the moral sentiments that have led people to
value freedom, equality, and representative government are predicated upon strong
reciprocity and related motivations that go beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal
altruism." Id. The early economists did not equate wealth maximization with
rational behavior. Adam Smith, for example, defined prudence as "[w]ise and
judicious conduct, when directed to greater and nobler purposes than the care of the
health, the fortune, the rank and reputation of the individual." ADAM SMITH, THE
THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 253 (Knud Haakonssen ed., 2002) (1759). Prudence
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self-interest may not only be normatively undesirable, but at
times lead to sub-optimal economic outcomes.
One common experiment that reflects such sub-optimal
outcomes is the Ultimatum Game. 8 4 When researchers expanded
this experiment beyond university students to fifteen small-scale
economies from twelve countries on four continents, 85 these group
members, like the university students, behaved in a reciprocal
manner and did not offer the nominal amount. But the range of
offers varied more amongst members of these small-scale
economies than did the range of offers by university students.
Differences among societies in "market integration" and
"cooperation in production" explain[ed] a substantial portion of
the behavioral variation between groups: The higher the degree
of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation,
the greater the level of cooperation and sharing in experimental
games. The societies were rank-ordered in five categories-

should be "combined with many greater and more splendid virtues, with valour, with
extensive and strong benevolence, with a sacred regard to the rules of justice, and all
these supported by a proper degree of self-command." Id. Benevolence was not
simply a normative ideal for Smith; individuals acted, at times, out of goodness, even
when they derived nothing financially from it. Id. at 11 ("How selfish soever man
may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest
him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he
derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.").
84 In the Ultimatum Game, two players are shown a sum of money, for example
$100, of which one player, the "proposer," must offer an amount of his discretion to
the second player, the "responder." Gintis et al., supra note 83, at 157. If the
recipient accepts the offer, the money is shared as the first player proposed, but if
the recipient rejects the offer, both get nothing. Id. Under rational choice theory,
where players pursue their economic self-interest, the offer would be a nominal sum,
for example one penny, which the recipient would accept. Id. When actually played,
however,
the self-interested outcome is never attained and never even approximated.
In fact, as many replications of this experiment have documented, under
varying conditions and with varying amounts of money, proposers routinely
offer respondents very substantial amounts (50% of the total generally
being the modal offer) and respondents frequently reject offers below 30%.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing various experiments).
8- The groups studied included:
[T]hree foraging groups (the Hadza of East Africa, the Au and Gnau of
Papua New Guinea, and the Lamalera of Indonesia), six slash-and-burn
horticulturists (the Ache, Machiguenga, Quichua, and Achuar of South
America and the Tsimane and Orma of East Africa), four nomadic herding
groups (the Turguud, Mongols, and Kazakhs of Central Asia, and the
Sangu of East Africa), and two sedentary, small-scale agricultural societies
(the Mapuche of South America and Zimbabwe farmers in Africa).
Id. at 158.
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"market integration" (how often do people buy and sell, or work
for a wage), "cooperation in production" (is production collective
or individual), plus "anonymity" (how prevalent are anonymous
roles and transactions), "privacy" (how easily can people keep
their activities secret), and "complexity" (how much centralized
decision-making occurs above the level of the household). Using
statistical regression analysis, only the first two characteristics,
market integration and cooperation in production, were
significant, and they together accounted for 66 of the variation
among societies in mean ultimatum game offers. 86 Moreover,
"the nature and degree of cooperation and punishment in the
experiments," they found, were "generally consistent with
economic patterns of everyday life in these societies. In a
number of cases, the parallels between experimental game play
8' 7
and the structure of daily life were quite striking.
Id.
Id. at 159. As the behavioral economists reported:
The Orma immediately recognized that the public goods game was similar
to... a locally initiated contribution that households make when a

86
87

community decides to construct a road or school ...

and [they] gave

generously (mean 58% with 25% maximal contributors).
Among the Au and Gnau, many proposers offered more than half the pie
[fifty percent], and many of these "hyperfair" offers were rejected! This
reflects the Melanesian culture of status-seeking through gift giving.
Making a large gift is a bid for social dominance in everyday life in these
societies, and rejecting the gift is a rejection of being subordinate.
Among the whale hunting Lamalera, 63% of the proposers in the
ultimatum game divided the pie equally ...(the mean offer was 57%). In
real life, a large catch, always the product of cooperation among many
individual whalers, is meticulously divided into predesignated parts and
carefully distributed among the members of the community.
Among the Ache, 79% of proposers offered either 40% or 50% and 16%
offered more than 50%, with no rejected offers. In daily life, the Ach6
regularly share meat, which is being distributed equally among all other
households, irrespective of which hunter made the kill.
[In contrast,] the Hadza. . . made low offers and had high rejection rates
in the ultimatum game. This reflects the tendency of these small-scale
foragers to share meat, but a high level of conflict and frequent attempts of
hunters to hide their catch from the group.
Both the Machiguenga and Tsimane made low ultimatum game offers,
and there were virtually no rejections. These groups exhibit little
cooperation,
exchange,
or
sharing
beyond
the
family
unit.
Ethnographically, both show little fear of social sanctions and care little
about "public opinion."
The Mapuche's social relations are characterized by mutual suspicion,
envy, and fear of being envied. This pattern is consistent with the
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Likewise, in reviewing traits that appear with regularity in
studies of cultures of high-performing and adaptive companies, a
senior advisor to McKinsey & Co. identified ten illustrative
performing, cooperating, and innovating norms. These coincide
with religious and ethical norms involving respect and reciprocity
(for example, do unto others as you would have them do unto
you), honesty, and trust.8 8 Why would we internalize ethical and
religious norms fostering cooperation in many facets of our daily
life, with our family members, neighbors, co-workers, customers,
and suppliers, 89 but then encourage self-interest, disrespect,
distrust, and dishonesty toward our competitors?
On a macro level, as economist Benjamin Friedman
describes, whenever America was mired in economic stagnation
its democratic values stagnated as well.
Hostility toward
immigrants, the poor, and other competing groups, whether by
nationality, religion, race, or gender, increased as these groups
were seemingly threatened by others stealing their fixed, or
dwindling, share of the pie. In contrast, during periods of
economic growth, our society slowly progressed from this zerosum mentality toward openness, mobility, and democracy. 90
Mapuche's

postgame

interviews

in

the

ultimatum

game.

Mapuche

proposers rarely claimed that their offers were influenced by fairness, but
rather [by a] fear of rejection. Even proposers who made hyperfair offers
claimed that they feared rare spiteful responders, who would be willing to
reject even 50/50 offers.
Id.
8 BEINHOCKER, supra note 56, at 370-71.

89 The internalization of such norms has many beneficial attributes, including
reducing the costs to police and punishing deviant behavior, as
[a]ll successful cultures foster internal norms that enhance personal
fitness, such as future orientation, good personal hygiene, positive work
habits, and control of emotions. Cultures also universally promote altruistic
norms that subordinate the individual to group welfare, fostering such
behaviors as bravery, honesty, fairness, willingness to cooperate, and
empathy with distress of others.
Bowles & Gintis, supra note 82, at 440.
90 BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
79-102 (2005). Professor Friedman identifies several historical time periods where
society, in response to economic growth, moved toward greater openness, tolerance,
mobility, fairness, and democracy: (1) the Horatio Alger era (1865-1880), (2) the
Progressive era (1895-1919), (3) the Civil Rights era (1945-1973), and (4) tentatively
the New beginnings (1993 onward, which early on had widely distributed rising
incomes, but is questionable today). Id. at 214. In contrast, American society moved
away from these Enlightenment ideals in response to periods of economic
stagnation, such as (1) the Populist era (1880-95), (2) the Klan era (1920-29), and
(3) the Backlash era (1973-93). Id. The one great exception, as Professor Friedman
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Rather than assume competition policy as refereeing a zerosum game, competition authorities may want to promote some
non-zero-sum forms of cooperation that promote overall welfare,
such as joint venturers pooling resources and labor to develop
new products or technologies. Antitrust enforcers would still
punish forms of cooperation that harm consumers, such as
competitors colluding to fix prices and transfer wealth from
consumers to themselves.9 1 Indeed, the United States antitrust
policies over the past twenty years have increasingly
acknowledged the procompetitive benefits of such cooperation
among competitors. The FTC and DOJ Joint Venture Guidelines
recognize that: (1) "[i]n order to compete in modern markets,
competitors sometimes need to collaborate," (2) "[c]ompetitive
forces are driving firms toward complex collaborations to achieve
goals such as expanding into foreign markets, funding expensive
innovation efforts, and lowering production and other costs," and
(3) "[s]uch collaborations often are not only benign but
procompetitive. '' 92 Such cooperation among competitors may not

describes, was the New Deal era (1929-39). Not only did this economic disaster have
an extraordinarily widespread impact, but "the socially corrosive power of a more
ordinary economic distress [was] overwhelmed by still stronger forces of a different
kind if the distress [was] so great as to constitute an out-and-out crisis." Id. at 178.
If America can no longer sustain its rising standard of living for its citizens, then our
democratic ideals are under greater risk as we move toward a zero-sum game
mentality. As Professor Friedman concludes, "[o]nly with sustained economic
growth, and the sense of confident progress that follows from the advance of living
standards for most of its citizens, can even a great nation find the energy, the
wherewithal, and most importantly the human attitudes that together sustain an
open, tolerant, and democratic society." Id. at 436.
91 BEINHOCKER, supra note 56, at 274 ("Complex, large-scale cooperation is
impossible without a well-functioning legal and regulatory system.").
92 FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 1 (2000), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/
04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf. In the last twenty years, "the federal antitrust agencies have
brought relatively few civil cases against competitor collaborations. Nevertheless, a
perception that antitrust laws are skeptical about agreements among actual or
potential competitors may deter the development of procompetitive collaborations."
Id. Moreover, "Congress has protected certain collaborations from full antitrust
liability
by
passing
the
National
Cooperative
Research
Act
of 1984 ("NCRA") and the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of
1993 ("NCRPA") (codified together at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-06)." Id. at 1 n.1. See
generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-06 (2000).

978
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necessarily lead to procompetitive results,9 3 but it may not cause
anticompetitive effects either.
Another implication for viewing competition broadly to
include non-zero-sum aspects is the positive spillover effects of
localized competition. Under a zero-sum view of competition, one
firm's gain is another firm's loss. One concern in developing
countries is that "cut throat" competition leads to firms exiting
the market "to the detriment of the sector and the economy
overall." 94 But Michael Porter and others have identified how
competitors mutually gain from localized competition, such as
improving the quality of their labor pool and strengthening their
network of suppliers. 9 5 Such localized competition may spur
variety in products, as competitors strive to differentiate from
their rivals' products, as well as in production techniques and
strategies, which will lead to further innovation.
Under a
dynamic evolutionary process, such competition might have
informational benefits, as firms learn from their rivals' mistakes
and mimic and improve upon their rivals' successes.
One
empirical study found a positive correlation between industry
variety and performance. 96
In considering why the entire
industry benefits when firms pursue a variety of competitive
strategies, the study's authors posit that with less variety, there
will be less opportunity for the firms to learn of the changing
97
conditions and demands and appropriate responses thereto.

93 Professor Porter, for example, "collected data on all [Japanese] governmentsponsored cooperative research projects, which involved several if not most industry
competitors. [He] found that those industries in which cooperative research projects
occurred were no more likely than the average industry to be competitive, and many
cooperative research projects actually worked against industry competitiveness."

Michael E. Porter, Competition and Antitrust: A Productivity-Based Approach, in
UNIQUE VALUE: COMPETITION BASED ON INNOVATION: CREATING UNIQUE VALUE
FOR ANTITRUST, THE ECONOMY, EDUCATION AND BEYOND 154, 160 (Charles D.

Weller ed., 2004), available at http://www.isc.hbs.edu/053002antitrust.pdf. Professor

Porter also noted that "[tihere have been many collaborative projects in the West
involving multiple industry competitors growing out of the efforts to emulate the
Japanese case, such as the electric vehicle project. With few if any exceptions, these

have proven disappointing." Id.
94 CUTS, supra note 9, at 28.
95 See, e.g., Grant Miles et al., Industry Variety and Performance, 14 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 163, 164 (1993) (collecting studies); Porter, supra note 93, at 161-65.

96 Miles et al., supra note 95, at 166-72. The study also found that such variety

decreased as the industry matured and declined. Id. at 172.
97 Id. at 174.
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To evolve, economies must rely on such complex, large-scale
cooperation.
Technological innovation is often non-zero-sum,
servicing a need currently unmet, rather than zero-sum, taking
revenues away from entrenched competitors.
With the
proliferation of brands and increasing product differentiation,
competition may no longer be characterized as zero-sum, but as
the continual development of products and services to satisfy
diverse and unsatisfied needs. 98 Increased competition can lead
firms to differentiate and develop new products and experiment
with new processes, technologies, or designs, which will lead to
greater variety and interest in that category.
2.

Competition as a Dynamic Complex Evolutionary Process

By undertaking more empirical research, policy officials will
better understand the dynamics of particular markets. The
federal
agencies'
Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, like
microeconomic
theory
generally,
assume
markets
are
characterized by a static equilibrium, and do not distinguish
between manufacturers of computer software and toilet paper. 99
98 In my experience with consumer product mergers, retailers were not
interested in devoting shelf space to new products that simply diverted sales from
existing products. Instead, retailers wanted products that offered consumers
something new and generated incremental demand and sales in the category.
99 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES (1997), reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
13,104,
available at http://usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz-book/hmgl.html [hereinafter
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES]. In 1984, the DOJ revised the 1982 Merger
Guidelines "to correct any misperception that the [1982] Guidelines are a set of rigid
mathematical formulas that ignore market realities and rely solely on a static view
of the marketplace." DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT TO ACCOMPANY RELEASE OF
1984 MERGER GUIDELINES (June 14, 1984), reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
13,103. THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES NOTE CHANGING MARKET
CONDITIONS. SEE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra § 1.52 1. The competition
agencies later discussed an "innovation market," which consists of "research and
development directed to particular new or improved goods or processes, and the close
substitutes for that research and development." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED.
TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY § 3.2.3 (1995), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf. This is
a narrow view of an innovation market. It assumes that the input-specialized
research and development ("R&D") assets or characteristics of specific firms-is a
proxy for the output, technological innovation. It depends on the identification of
other rival R&D efforts, technologies, and goods that significantly constrain the
exercise of market power by the R&D effort. Two antitrust practitioners recently
noted the significant omission of innovation in the FTC and DOJ's guidelines and
commentary. Darren S. Tucker & Bilal Sayyed, The Merger Guidelines Commentary:
PracticalGuidance and Missed Opportunities,ANTITRUST SOURCE, May 2006, at 11-
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When subject to an exogenous force, such as entry, government
regulation, new technology, or an energy crisis, this equilibrium
is temporarily disrupted, and then ultimately comes to rest at the
new equilibrium. Many markets, however, may not be static
equilibrium systems; rather, they are complex adaptive systems.
In recent years, evolutionary economic theory, building upon
Schumpeter's disequilibrium dynamics, has identified the
shortcomings of competition, under neoclassical economic theory,
in explaining industries where technological change drives
economic growth. 10 0
One shortcoming of the neoclassical conception of
competition is its assumption of an equilibrium. "[E]volutionary
theory refutes the neoclassical economic theory's focus on a
steady state of the economic system." 10 1 Firms, as individuals,
make mistakes, readjust, and undertake new strategies. The
competitive process "is inherently a process of trial and error
with no stable end-state considered by the participants in the
02
process."1
A second shortcoming of the neoclassical conception of
competition is its assumption that market forces curb the
exercise of market power and veer the market toward allocative
and productive efficiency. It is silent on path dependency.
Private and government agents' prior choices ultimately
constrain the set of future choices. 10 3 Some industries, like
evolutionary processes generally, may be characterized by a
degree of persistence of random events. "Rather than being
additive to a deterministic equilibrium, small random events in
evolutionary processes may accumulate into larger factors that
may change the nature of the system and its history." 10 4 For
example, George Black chronicles how small random events
(such as a leak in a dam) shaped the economic development along
western Connecticut's three rivers, so that hiking today along the
Appalachian Trail in Kent is a far different experience than
12, http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/06/O5/MayO6-Tucker5=24f.pdf.
100 For an antitrust litigator's discussion of the application of evolutionary
theories of diversity to antitrust, see Thomas J. Horton, Competition or Monopoly?
The Implications of Complexity Science, Chaos Theory and Evolutionary Biology for
Antitrust and Competition Policy, 51 ANTITRUST BULL. 195 (2006).

101Moreau, supra note 49, at 851.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 852.
104 Verspagen, supra note 67, at 4.
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along the Naugatuck River in Waterbury. 10 5 Thus, history does
matter. Market power, if left unchecked, may have greater
implications beyond that industry.
Third, unlike the neoclassical theory of a single equilibrium,
industries may have multiple equilibria. The speed with which
the market approaches these equilibria may vary over time, and
the equilibria themselves may change because of change in the
system itself.10 6 The result is that "equilibrium points in an
evolutionary system are rarely actually reached."1 0 7 Instead,
these equilibrium points "serve as an attractor that pulls the
system towards itself for a prolonged period, before giving way to
08
a new attractor."'
What do these shortcomings mean for competition policy?
First, it shows that it is much harder to predict competitive
outcomes in these dynamic markets than under the single
equilibrium models of neoclassical economic theory. It means
that "[flor better or for worse, economic life is an adventure." 10 9
As competitive dynamics change in unforeseen ways, firms must
continually accommodate and adjust to make the most of these
changes.1 10 Those adjustments and accommodations, in turn,
lead to further change by private and public institutions.'
For
example, take the three adjacent Connecticut Rivers: the
Housatonic, the Shepaug, and the Naugatuck. Over time, the
persistence of random events, such as a failed company, a leak in
a dam, and the growth in demand for brass "will lead to an
accumulation of random events that is different from every
realization of a stochastic process, again leading to completely
different outcomes" among the three rivers. 112 Today, the
Housatonic River in northwestern Connecticut is heavily wooded,
with trout anglers; the Naugatuck is heavily industrialized. If
the history tape was rewound, and events again unfolded, the
situation today among the three rivers might differ. Thus, under
105 See GEORGE BLACK, THE TROUT POOL PARADOX: THE AMERICAN LIVES OF
THREE RIVERS 10-11 (2004).
106Verspagen, supra note 67, at 4.
107
108

Id.
Id.

109 RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF
ECONOMIC CHANGE 370 (1982).
110 Id.
111 See id.
112 Verspagen, supra note 67, at 5.
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an evolutionary economic process, "chance plays a significant
role" and "small, random (and therefore unpredictable) events
1 13
may have severe long-run consequences."
A second policy implication of dynamic competitive processes
is in assessing the predictive quality of any economic model.
Although economic life is an adventure, it is not a roller coaster.
Waking up tomorrow morning, I would not expect the price of my
newspaper or bagel to have doubled overnight, or my employer to
have slashed my salary in half. So why does my comfort level
decrease when trying to forecast bagel prices over a larger
geographic area over a longer time? These models' predictive
quality will lessen as the heterogeneity of what is being studied
increases. In these larger scale systems, "contingencies and
random factors" are more likely to play a key and unforeseen
role.

114

It is unclear how accurately the agencies currently predict a
merger's
likely
anticompetitive
effect
across
different
115
industries.
For antitrust enforcers conducting merger
simulations, the narrower the product category and geographic
market and the shorter the time horizon, the less likely that
contingencies and random factors will play a material role in
making outcomes indeterminate. 116 But these static single113

Id. at 6.

114

Id. at 10-11.

For further examination of this issue, and proposals to foster ex-post merger
review, see Stucke, BehavioralEconomists, supra note 69, at 516, 579.
116 For example, suppose two leading manufacturers of white pan bread decide
to merge. Using retailers' in-store scan data, econometricians can examine what
impact changes in the retail price of one brand, such as Wonder white-pan bread,
recently had on the unit sales of other branded or private label products, such as rye
bread, bagels, or wheat bread. Using the scan data for white pan bread purchases in
a specific market, such as Chicago, an econometrician may predict accurately the
price of white bread shortly after the merger. But predicting bread prices across the
United States (or globally) over a longer time period invites uncertainty as
unforeseen events may affect demand, such as diet fads, or supply, such as weather
impacting crops. See Daniel Hosken et al., Demand System Estimation and Its
Application to Horizontal Merger Analysis 5 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Bureau of Econ.,
Working Paper No. 246, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.govlbe/workpapersl
wp246.pdf (discussing use of scanner data for demand estimation); David Scheffman
& Mary Coleman, FTC Perspectives on the Use of Econometric Analyses in Antitrust
Cases 9 (undated) (draft document), http://www.ftc.govlbe/ftcperspectiveson
econometrics.pdf (discussing the use of scanner data for demand estimation and
other relevant economic analyses); David Scheffman, Best Practices for Data, and
Economics and Financial Analyses in Antitrust Investigations (Apr. 2002)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.ftc.govfbe/ftcbebp.pdf (providing guidelines on
115
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equilibrium models may be unsuitable for competition policy,
which typically looks at larger scale systems, such as consumer
goods industries, on a national or international scale, over a
longer period.
Given the heterogeneity of these large-scale
systems, contingencies and random factors are more likely to
play a key and unforeseen role, lessening the model's predictive
quality. 117 Even on the micro level, assessing a merger's impact
on technological innovation may be difficult given the importance
With
of path dependence arising from network effects. 1 8
multiple equilibria and the role of chance, the government may
be unable to predict accurately ex ante the winning technology.
A third important implication of dynamic markets is
determining where this newness will emerge. Policy-makers
generally recognize Schumpeter's "creative destruction" thesis
that capitalism "is by nature a form or method of economic
change and not only never is but never can be stationary."'" 19
Some also accept that competition from new commodities,
technologies, sources of supply, and types of organization may be
of greater import than static price competition. 20 But where and
economic analysis for meeting with FTC Bureau of Economics); see also FED. TRADE
COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER

GUIDELINES 6, 8, 9, 14 (2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/215247.pdf
(describing use of scan data to estimate demand elasticities for branded consumer
products).
117 Verspagen, supra note 67, at 10-11.
118 In markets with network effects, the value of a product or service increases
as others use the products or service. The classic examples are found in the
communication industries; for example, the telephone, the facsimile machine, and
the Internet.
119 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM,

SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY

82

(Unwin Paperbacks 1987) (1942). As Jay Barney indicated, Schumpeter's view of
competition has not been applied to normative theories of strategies as well as the
Industrial Organization and Chaberlinian conceptions of competition. This is not
because Schumpeterian competition is less realistic than the other two, but it is less
translatable into strategic models. Moreover, Schumpeter relies on random events
and the "concept of luck is difficult to incorporate into normative theories of strategy,
for luck typically is not subject to managerial manipulation." Jay B. Barney, Types of
Competition and the Theory of Strategy: Toward an Integrative Framework, supra
note 53, at 796. Telling managers that luck, rather than their skill, may yield
success will not sell many management strategy books either. The better formula is
to tell managers what they are doing wrong, and how implementing the book's novel
management strategy will yield commercial success.
120 Several economists testifying before the AMC also expressed this view. AMC
REPORT, supra note 18, at 45 n.59 ("[DUynamic competition to develop new products
and to improve existing products [in innovation-driven industries] can have much
greater impacts on consumer welfare than static price competition .... Everyone
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when will this newness arrive? Schumpeter hypothesized "that
firms that have market power, not just the prospect of market
power, were the driving force in this process-a view that
empirical studies have somewhat called into question." 12 1 The
economic department for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") found "little empirical
support" for Schumpeter's hypothesis that large firm size or high
concentration is strongly associated with a higher level of
innovative activity. 122 This presents an important policy issue.
At times, some defend the short-run allocative efficiency losses
from firms with significant market power with the belief that
such industrial concentration is conducive to innovation. 123 But
the dynamics of competition is such that neither the government
nor the dominant firm can predict who will provide these
disruptive technologies in the future. Moreover, technological
innovation is only one component of innovation, which
encompasses improvements in government institutions and
corporate organizational structures.
A fourth implication of such evolutionary economic processes
is in keeping markets open. Competition policy should not
preserve monopolies or tolerate their anticompetitive abuses in
should understand that small increases in productivity from innovation dwarf even
significant reductions in static efficiency over time.... [A]t least over the medium to
long term, the lion's share of consumer benefits associated with competition in our
most dynamic industries results from innovation."); see also Porter, supra note 93, at
156-57 (questioning whether antitrust should be focused primarily on price
competition when other parameters of competition, such as innovation or
productivity, may play a more important role).
121 Vickers, supra note 53, at 16.
122

Sanghoon Ahn, Competition, Innovation and Productivity Growth: A Review

of Theory & Evidence 5 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Econ. Dep't, Working
Paper No. 317, 2002). Ahn nicely summarizes the difficulties in measuring
innovation, including the drawbacks of relying on patent and research and
development ("R&D") data. See id. at 14. This is more fully discussed in my
upcoming article. See Stucke, supra note 78.
123 The head of the Antitrust Division during the Clinton Administration
disagreed:
In a world driven by rapid changes in technology, empirical evidence
indicates that the firms that prosper are far more likely to be those that
face fierce rivalry in their home markets than the sheltered monopolists. In
a very real sense, the fear of being left behind is more likely to spur
innovation than the security bred of stable market power.
Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Competition and Innovation: Bedrock of the American Economy, Address Before the
University of Kansas Law School (Sept. 19, 1996), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/speeches/0877.pdf.

2008]

BETTER COMPETITIONADVOCACY

the hopes that these national champions will provide
technological change.
Nor can competition officials wait
passively for the Schumpeterian creative destruction; such
passivity at times delays its arrival. But dynamic markets create
a problem for competition authorities, given that competition
officials, like private actors, suffer informational asymmetries;
the degree to which may differ, however. Given the government's
ability to depose numerous market participants and subpoena
their records, the government may be little better in predicting
outcomes. Suppose Firm A engages in anticompetitive practices.
Given the acceleration of Firm A's market power through
network effects, the government may be unable to react quickly
to remedy the anticompetitive harm. 124 At other times, by the
time the government investigates and successfully challenges
Firm A for its anticompetitive restraint, market conditions have
evolved.125 Rather than trying to preempt or belatedly react,
competition policy instead should focus on promoting (1) the
introduction of variation, (2) a consistent selection process by
end-users, (3) mechanisms that preserve and propagate the
selected variation, and (4) mechanisms that further promote the
introduction of variation on the selected variation.1 26 To promote
this process, competition authorities may want to (1) define
specific actions by entrenched dominant firms that are
presumptively illegal, 127 (2) keep structural entry barriers as low

See Moreau, supra note 49, at 865.
125 In reviewing the history of seven monopolization cases, for example,
Professor Scherer found that by the time the courts were ready for judgment,
"technological and economic changes had radically altered the environment in which
the remedies originally sought would apply." F.M. Scherer, Technological Innovation
and Monopolization 63 (Harvard Univ. John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Working
Paper No. RWP07-043, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=1103594.
126 Mantzavinos, supra note 65, at 4 n.4.
127 Several antitrust commentators, for example, identified categories of "cheap"
predation and exclusion which (1) "costs or risks little" to the entrenched firm, "both
in absolute terms and when compared to the gains (or potential for gains) it brings,"
and (2) does not raise any cognizable efficiency claims. Susan A. Creighton et al.,
Cheap Exclusion, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 975, 977 (2005) (writing for the Federal Trade
Commission Ninetieth Anniversary Symposium).
124
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as possible, 128 (3) eliminate subsidies that distort demand, 12913 and
0
(4) stimulate the firms' and government's learning processes.
Rather than support a command-and-control approach to
technological change, for example, by protecting national
champions or subsidizing their research and development
("R&D") efforts, the government may seek to promote the
evolutionary change from the bottom up. Competition officials
may want to promote, or at least not penalize, user-centered
innovation, such as open-source software. Such user-centered
innovation, whereby users simultaneously experiment and
provide variation, may lead quickly and efficiently to better

Professor Scherer, as many others, argues that the "for limited times" the
language in Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution "should be taken seriously
in order to promote the progress of science and the useful arts." Scherer, supra note
125, at 49. An informed discussion of the optimal level of intellectual property
protection to promote innovation, which may vary by the nature of the intellectual
property, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
129 The frequent target is direct industry subsidies through state-aid, such as
the subsidizing of water costs for Saudi alfalfa and wheat farmers, which use three
times the global average of water to produce one ton of wheat in the desert and have
production costs 4 to 6 times the world price. Rice and wheat farmers in California's
central valley, which use one-fifth of the state's water, also pay low water prices,
with an estimated annual subsidy of $416 million. See Alan Beattie & Fiona Harvey,
Subsidies Interrupt Flow of "Virtual Water,' FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 10, 2006, at 6.
Another hindrance is when the government--or public-indirectly subsidizes certain
negative externalities. For example, suppose the government wishes to combat
global warming through innovation. The government may be unable to pick the
winning technology or technologies, but feels pressure to do something. Rather than
subsidize one or more technologies that it predicts will be the winning technologies,
the government may instead choose to reduce entry barriers into this field, and
distortionary subsidies to stimulate consumption. Thus, some fuels today may be
cheaper because their retrieval is subsidized and their environmental harms are not
internalized. If certain fuels, such as coal, impose greater social costs-such as
health problems, acid rain, or global warming-but these costs are not internalized
in the product (through a carbon tax, for example), consumers have little incentive to
switch from these fuels to more efficient, less harmful energy sources. The
government can internalize the externalities of each energy source through an
energy tax. Consumers can still opt for coal or switch to a cleaner fuel source,
depending on the relative costs. The social pressures for demand will be created for
these alternatives, and ultimately as consumers increasingly switch to certain
technologies, economies of scale as well as network effects will arise. Unforeseen
intervening events may further shape consumer attitudes and demand for these
energy sources, such as a melt-down of a nuclear reactor. Ultimately, the
government does not select the winners from the losers.
130 A central role of policy is promoting the free flow of information about the
ongoing experiments and feedback from that experimentation, which in turn enables
the private and government agents to adapt and experiment with more changes. See
Moreau, supra note 49, at 852-53.
128
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solutions than a dominant firm's trying to anticipate the designs
131
or improvements that meet future needs of its customers.
Fundamentally, the competition policy should seek to promote
innovation coming not solely from the top down, such as central
planning by an entrenched firm or the government, but also from
the bottom up, as users tinker with, change, and improve the
design that continuously evolves. Subject to legitimate welfare
issues, such as protecting health and safety, the government
should also encourage experimentation by removing controls on
the range or type of goods and services that companies can
offer. 132
Under this evolutionary theory of competition, it is unclear
who will provide tomorrow's technological advancements,
The hubris of a
innovation, and dynamic improvements.
centrally-planned socialist state or corporate bureaucracy is its
confidence in predicting winners and losers. There may be
several technological designs at work, some of which for quality,
mistake, luck, or opportunity, become dominant; others for the
same reasons recede. Thus, by undertaking more empirical
research, policy makers can learn more about the various
industries' market dynamics and the extent to which promoting
access to that marketplace to new entrants or small rivals may
be more important than reaping static economies of scale.
II.

WHAT ARE THE OBJECTIVES OF COMPETITION?

Competition as a Process
Rather than being seen as an idealized state, such as perfect
competition or an independent good, competition instead can be
defined as a means-a utilitarian device-to achieve certain
goals such as efficiency, consumer welfare, or individual
autonomy. Competition is not the end, but instead is the more
efficient and democratic means to achieve a particular end.

A.

131 A positive feedback loop emerges from the learning effects from the diffused
technologies. Rather than internally creating and testing variations to its
technology, the supplier can promote experimentation by the end-user. As users
experiment and alter the technology, the supplier learns from this diffusion. In the
next round, the supplier, in turn, can offer this greater diffusion of offerings, which
various users can further modify. See J.S. Metcalfe, Evolutionary Economics and
Technology Policy, 104 ECON. J. 931, 939 (1994).
132 Italian petrol operators are limited, for example, on the goods they can offer.
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Competition, so defined, presents two critical questions: (1) what
do we want?; and (2) what is the best way to get there?
If competition is not an end, but "a policy tool to achieve
broader government objectives for the economy or for a given
industry,"133 then the critical question is what are the objectives
of competition? One highly regarded antitrust treatise states
that the general goal of the antitrust laws is "to promote
'competition' as the economist understands that term." 134 But
the antitrust community has debated for years over (1) whether
competition policy can have multiple goals or a single goal, and
(2) the nature of the particular goals, including whether the goal
or goals should encompass non-economic objectives.
The United States competition agencies recently stated that
the "promotion of consumer welfare and the organization of the
free market economy are the only goals of its antitrust
laws ... with other economic or social objectives better pursued
by other instruments."'1 35 A former FTC chairman argued for
centering the goals of competition policy on narrow economic
concerns, such as efficiency, which he stated is free from
normative judgments. He praised the Reagan Administration's
bringing to antitrust agencies a "solid framework" for antitrust
policy: "Antitrust finally regarded enhancing consumer welfare
as the single unifying goal of competition policy, and it used a
framework that was based on sound economics, both theoretical
and empirical."1 36
Similarly, under the Chicago School's
neoclassical economic theories, antitrust analysis is primarily
concerned with efficiency. 37 Judge Bork summarized the whole
133 DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS COMPETITION COMM., ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., GLOBAL FORUM ON COMPETITION: ROUNDTABLE ON

BRINGING COMPETITION INTO REGULATED SECTORS 2 (2005), http://www.ftc.
gov/bc/internationaldocscompcomm2005-Roundtable%20on%2OBringing%20
Competition.pdf [hereinafter OECD, REGULATED SECTORS].
134 PHILLIP

E.

AREEDA

&

HERBERT

HOVENKAMP,

1 ANTITRUST

ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION

LAW:

AN

100, at 4 (3d ed.

2006).
13.5
2007 ICN REPORT, supra note 19, at 31.
136 Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward:The Federal Trade Commission and the
Future Development of U.S. Competition Policy, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359, 388
(2003).
137 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 91-92 (1993); Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust
Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1982) ("The view that the federal antitrust laws
ought to promote allocative efficiency in American business and markets has come to
dominate antitrust policy in the last decade."); Posner, supra note 23, at 928 ("From
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task of antitrust "as the effort to improve allocative efficiency
without impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce
either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare." 13 Although
antitrust has a built-in preference for property, these adherents,
following the familiar path of utilitarian welfare economics,
argue that competition policy "has nothing to say about the ways
prosperity is distributed or used."1 39 Thus, for some scholars,
140
antitrust has no ethical component.
Others disagree. In reviewing the Sherman Act's legislative
histories, several antitrust scholars and the Supreme Court
noted Congress's non-economic concerns about the concentration
of wealth and power in the hands of the few. 4 1 Former FTC

these various analyses, a conclusion of great significance for antitrust policy
emerges: firms cannot in general obtain or enhance monopoly power by unilateral
action-unless, of course, they are irrationally willing to trade profits for position.").
Maximizing economic efficiency, which is the maximization of aggregate consumer
and producer surplus, requires the maximization of (1) allocative (Pareto)
efficiency-allocating resources to their "highest valued useD," such that it is "not

possible to make anyone better off without making someone worse off," and
(2) productive (technological) efficiency-producing the products or services at the
lowest possible cost. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., GLOSSARY OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION ECONOMICS AND COMPETITION LAW 41, 65 (1993),

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/61/2376087.pdf
[hereinafter OECD GLOSSARY];
Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, Rhetoric and Reality in the Merger Standards
of the United States, Canada, and the European Union, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 423, 428
(2005).
138 BORK, supra note 137, at 91.
139 Id. at 90.
140 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations in Securities Markets, 28 J.
CORP. L. 607, 609 (2003) ("[Alntitrust has no moral content and is unconcerned
about the distribution of wealth."); see also BORK, supra note 137, at 90 ("Consumer
welfare, as that term is used in antitrust, has no sumptuary or ethical component,
but permits consumers to define by their expression of wants in the marketplace
what things they regard as wealth.").
141 The debates in 1890 show that
the main cause which led to the legislation was the thought that it was
required by the economic condition of the times; that is, the vast
accumulation of wealth in the hands of corporations and individuals ...
and the widespread impression that their power had been and would be
exerted to oppress individuals and injure the public generally.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911). "[T]he conviction was
universal that the country was in real danger from another kind of slavery sought to
be fastened on the American people; namely, the slavery that would result from
aggregations of capital in the hands of a few individuals and corporations .... " Id.
at 83 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 448 n.1 (2d Cir. 1945) ("The popular mind is
agitated with problems that may disturb social order, and among them all none is
more threatening than the inequality of condition, of wealth, and opportunity that
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Chairman Robert Pitofsky said, "[ijt is bad history, bad policy,
and bad law to exclude certain political values in interpreting the
antitrust laws." 142 One such political value is a "fear that
excessive concentration
of economic power will breed
antidemocratic political pressures." 143 An antitrust policy that
neglected to consider such political values "would be
unresponsive to the will of Congress." 144 Professor Sullivan
agreed, stating that
[t]o argue, as do the Chicago economists, that antitrust ought to
be used solely to inhibit expressions of market power in a
technical economic sense, is not only to miss much in the history
and development of the law, but to ignore much of its
potential.... The political consensus that supports antitrust
comes from other sources.
Americans continue to value
institutions the scale and the workings of which they can
comprehend. Many continue to value the decentralization of
decisionmaking power and responsibility.
Many favor
structures in which power in one locus may be checked by power
in another.
Antitrust, broadly perceived and sensitively
administered, may contribute to the realization of these
14 5
values.
Oliver Williamson in his famous trade-off calculus for
weighing the effects on total welfare, also included, to the extent
quantifiable: (1) the cost from slower-or the lack oftechnological progress once a monopolist or cartel lays claims to a
national market, and (2) the other social costs imposed, or
incurred, by the monopolist or cartel, such as the political
implications of control over wealth, which are "a matter for
146
serious concern."
has grown within a single generation out of the concentration of capital into vast
combinations to control production and trade and to break down competition.");

Eleanor M. Fox, The Battle for the Soul of Antitrust, 75 CAL. L. REV. 917, 919 (1987)
(citing concern for the "little man" and consumers as a goal of antitrust).
142 Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051,
1051 (1979) [hereinafter Pitofsky, The PoliticalContent of Antitrust].
143 Id.
144 Id. at 1052.
145 Lawrence Anthony Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines:
What Are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214, 1222-23
(1977).
146 Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 24, 28-32 (1968). With a powerful domestic
producer, for example, the government may be swayed to erect protectionist
measures. Id. at 29. The political implications may be beyond quantification, but as
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There is even a debate today about the transparency of
competition goals. Judge Posner surmised that
[a]lmost everyone professionally involved in antitrust todaywhether as litigator, prosecutor, judge, academic, or informed
observer-not only agrees that the only goal of the antitrust
laws should be to promote economic welfare, but also agrees on
the essential tenets of economic theory that should be used to
determine147the consistency of specific business practices with
that goal.
Michael Porter disagreed, arguing that
[t]he goals of antitrust and its link to society's goals are often
not convincingly articulated. The benefits of competition that
underpin antitrust have not been made clear, and the tools for
measuring impacts on competition are frequently controversial.
Too often the discussion between business and government in
antitrust proceedings concerns arcane matters such as HHI that
erodes the legitimacy of antitrust with the private sector. By
relying too heavily on narrowly conceived consumer welfare
theory, antitrust analysis may be overlooking some of the most
important benefits of competition for society. Antitrust is not
living up to its full promise in deterring behavior that is not in
148
society's interest.
B.

Competition Policy's Multiple Goals

In creating or reforming their competition agencies,
competition authorities from many developing countries are
considering the objectives of their nation's competition policy.
They are discussing with the various constituents the
fundamental questions of what is meant by competition, the
goals of the competition policy, and how the various stakeholders
will benefit from such a policy. 149 What have emerged are
different competition policy objectives in different countries. As
the International Competition Network ("ICN") noted, the
"objectives of competition laws vary widely from one jurisdiction
to another ....

[P]arallel objectives, possibly conflicting with that

Professor Williamson recognized, the issue is nevertheless important, and cannot be
ignored. Id.
147 POSNER, supra note 59, at ix. The basis for that assertion is not attributed to
any survey or other empirical research.
148 Porter, supra note 93, at 157.
149 CUTS, supra note 9, at i.
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of economic efficiency or consumer welfare, are present in many
competition laws." 150
One nation's objectives may conflict with other nations'
competition policies. At times, the nation's objectives for its
competition policy may conflict, such as ensuring a level playing
field while simultaneously maximizing efficiencies. Competition
policy can become a tautology, such as "promoting competition by
discouraging anti-competitive behaviour." 15 1
The ICN recently surveyed thirty-three of its members to
identify their competition policy's objectives regarding unilateral
(monopolistic) anticompetitive behavior. What emerged were the

following ten objectives:
" Ensuring an effective competitive process
"

Promoting consumer welfare

"

Enhancing efficiency

"

Ensuring economic freedom

"
"

Ensuring a level playing field for small and mid-sized
enterprises
Promoting fairness and equality

"

Promoting consumer choice

"

Achieving market integration

"

Facilitating privatization and market liberalization
Promoting competitiveness in international markets. 152

"

The diversity of goals of competition policy suggests that, in
regard to the first issue, competition policy does not have a
single, unified goal. As the ICN survey reflects, the more
abstract and meaningless the goal, the greater the likelihood of
consensus. All but one of the surveyed competition agencies cited
"[e]nsuring an effective competitive process" as an objective of the
unilateral conduct laws. Presumably, no one advocates for an
"ineffective" competitive process. What then is an "effective
150 ICN ADvoCAcY REPORT, supra note 1, at 32.
151 CUTS, supra note 9, at i.

152 2007 ICN REPORT, supra note 19, annex A. In its survey of competition

laws in

fifty countries,

the

World

Bank

found

"different

conceptions

competition... across countries." WORLD BANK, supra note 32, at 140.

of
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competitive process?" The survey does not explore this. Nor does
it further explore whether the process represents the end or the
153
means to some greater end, which must also be defined.
The second most popular objective cited in the ICN survey
Despite its pleasant
was "promoting consumer welfare."
democratic ring (who, after all, advocates hindering consumer
welfare?) it too suffers the same infirmities. Although thirty of
thirty-three ICN respondents identified this objective, most "do
not specifically define consumer welfare and appear to have
1 54
different economic understandings of the term."'
Similarly, the AMC, after spending three years and nearly
$4 million, could not reach unanimity on the term. Although
their 449-page report addresses how "antitrust law and
enforcement can best serve consumer welfare in the global, hightech economy that exists today,"'155 the debate before and within
the AMC was "about the precise definition of 'consumer
welfare.' "156 The twelve United States Commissioners, all with
distinguished backgrounds in competition policy, disagreed over
a relatively straightforward question: "Should efficiencies that
benefit only the [merging] parties, with no prospect of being
157
passed along to consumers, be counted in favor of a merger?"'
163 Fifteen competition agencies, including the United States', cited "[e]nsuring
an effective competitive process as a goal and/or a means" to achieve other goals.
2007 ICN REPORT, supra note 19, annex A. Four of the thirty-two agencies cited this
objective exclusively as a means to achieve other goals, while thirteen agencies cited
this objective as a goal. Id.
154 2007 ICN REPORT, supra note 19, at 9.
156AMC REPORT, supra note 18, at 1 (emphasis added).
156Id. at 26 n.22. The OECD defined "consumer welfare" as
the individual benefits derived from the consumption of goods and services.
In theory, individual welfare is defined by an individual's own assessment
of his/her satisfaction, given prices and income. Exact measurement of
consumer welfare therefore requires information about individual
preferences.
In practice, applied welfare economics uses the notion of consumer
surplus to measure consumer welfare. When measured over all consumers,
consumers' surplus is a measure of aggregate consumer welfare. In antitrust applications, some argue that the goal is to maximize consumers'
surplus, while others argue that producer benefits should also be counted.
OECD GLOSSARY, supra note 137, at 29.
157AMC REPORT, supra note 18, at 422-23. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines
treat efficiencies as a defense available for the merging parties. HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 99, § 4. The parties may argue that the merger will
generate efficiencies, which, in turn, will lead to lower prices for consumers. Some
have argued for expanding the availability of the efficiencies defense to mergers
where consumers would likely pay higher prices, but where the merging parties
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Commissioner Carlton, a University of Chicago professor, argued
yes. Total surplus is "used routinely in cost-benefit analysis, a
tool of widespread use in public policy." 158
Commissioner
Jacobson disagreed:
"Any doubts that a consumer welfare
would yield even greater productive efficiencies (the cost savings attributable to the
merger). For a discussion of the varying efficiency defenses, including the consumer
welfare and total welfare standards, see generally Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 137.
Under this total welfare standard, society would be better off since the merged
entity would consume fewer resources, which would be freed up for other consumers.
The problem is that no one knows whether, and to what extent, mergers in different
industries actually generate significant efficiencies. Management consulting firms,
for example, have noted that the merging parties' executives, at times, overstate the
likely efficiencies. For a summary of various management consulting studies, see
generally Paul A. Pautler, The Effects of Mergers and Post-Merger Integration: A
Review of Business Consulting Literature (Jan. 21, 2003) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.ftc.govlbe/rtfbusinesreviewpaper.pdf. Several have outlined the benefits
of verifying, after the merger, the parties' ex ante efficiency claims. See Stucke,
Behavioral Economists, supra note 69, at 582; see also Joseph F. Brodley, PostChicago Economics and Workable Legal Policy, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 683, 691-93
(1995); Robert Pitofsky, Proposalsfor Revised United States Merger Enforcement in a
Global Economy, 81 GEO. L.J. 195, 222-27 (1992) (proposing enforcement agencies'
conditional clearance of certain mergers subject to post-merger verification of
efficiencies); Dennis A. Yao & Thomas N. Dahdouh, Information Problems in Merger
Decision Making and Their Impact on Development of an Efficiencies Defense, 62
ANTITRUST L.J. 23, 26-27 (1993) (stating that post-merger review of efficiencies
equivalent to performance bonding by merging parties verify their assertion that
merger will realize efficiencies).
15s AMC REPORT, supra note 18, at 401. A senior economist at the DOJ,
Antitrust Division, however, has recently challenged the neoclassical economic
orthodoxy, and advocated a consumer welfare standard. Russell W. Pittman,
Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust Enforcement (U.S.
Dep't of Justice Econ. Analysis Group, Discussion Paper No. 07-9, 2007),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=996643. The Chicago School of
antitrust also views a cartel's net harm narrowly-typically, its deadweight welfare
loss. Deadweight loss refers to the triangular area under a downward sloping
demand curve representing the purchases foregone as a result of the
supracompetitive pricing. See BORK, supra note 137, at 111. Although others may
view the wealth transfer from the consumers to the cartel members as theft, the
Chicago School adherents view it agnostically as it does not lessen total wealth, so
any inequities of such wealth transfers should be addressed by the legislature. Id.;
see also William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 652, 653 (1983) ("The standard economic rationale for making a cartel illegal is
not that it charges too high a price or that it redistributes income from consumers to
cartel members, but that it restricts output, causing a deadweight or efficiency
loss ... a loss to consumers without an offsetting gain to producers."); DIRECTORATE
FOR FIN., FISCAL & ENTER. AFFAIRS COMPETITION COMM., ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., REPORT ON THE NATURE AND IMPACT OF HARD CORE CARTELS
AND SANCTIONS AGAINST CARTELS UNDER NATIONAL COMPETITION LAWS 6 (2002),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/20/2081831.pdf (noting economists' agnosticism
about whether society is made worse off by a mere wealth transfer from consumers
to cartel members).
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standard better reflects the goals of the antitrust laws than a
standard based on total welfare will serve only to undermine
19
antitrust enforcement in the future." 5
Thus, positing a single unifying goal, such as happiness,
efficiency, or consumer welfare is relatively easy. Both the
socialist central planner and dogmatic laissez faire adherent may
agree on the concept of a unifying social goal for competition
policy. They may even agree on the goal, if sufficiently broad to
embed their normative views. But this general objective simply
shifts the debate to the means of attaining that end. Everyone
wants happiness, but how does one achieve it-through wealth,
fame, power, virtuous life, or allocative, productive, and dynamic
efficiency? The challenge for the socialist or the dogmatic laissez
faire adherent is (1) to discount the means proposed by her
opponents, or (2) to define an end that is sufficiently narrow in
scope to preclude any means other than the idealist's. The
problem with the latter route is that, much to the idealist's
frustration, others may not share the idealist's narrowly defined
goal or its urgency. The idealist questions why others do not
recognize the self-evident benefits of her narrowly defined goal,
and bemoans to her compatriots that others do not accord their
goal the primacy it deserves. The idealist then represents the
ultimate central planner, for she has defined for society both the
goal and the particular means to achieve that goal.
Any
impediment to her ideal, such as governmental restraints to
protect workers or small businesses, must be shorn, to nurture
the growth of her idealized form of competition. Democracies
hinder such idealists if others do not share their view of
competition or the primacy of that particular competition policy
goal. 16 0 Thus, faced with opposition, the idealist, whether a
socialist or laissez faire adherent, may seek to remove
competition policy from the legislature, other federal or state

159 AMC REPORT, supra note 18, at 423. Although the use of the total versus

consumer surplus standard can have various implications for antitrust analysis, "the
cases in which the choice of standard would make a difference," the AMC concluded,

"are relatively few." Id. at 26 n.22.
160 As the ICN reported, it is unlikely that any will become Competition Czar
anytime soon: "It should be borne in mind, however, that competition authorities do
not usually possess a democratic mandate as direct as Government or Parliament.
Therefore, it does not seem realistic that such wide-ranging powers be given to
competition authorities, apart from the accountability problems it would raise." ICN
ADVOCACY REPORT, supra note 1, at 65.
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agencies, the generalist courts, or the general population and
place it in the hands of policy experts who share her ideal and
abhor seeing their shared conception of competition debased. 161
It becomes apparent that besides an idealist operating in a
totalitarian state, there cannot be a marriage between a unifying
single goal and single means. As the developing countries took
their competition policies to different stakeholders, each
expressed its own wants: Domestic competitors may advocate
protecting choice for consumers, as these less efficient domestic
companies may want protection from the efficiencies of
international competitors. 162
Entrepreneurs may agree but
emphasize greater access to the market place. Entrenched large
firms may want greater protection to achieve productive
efficiencies. Consumers may want it all: lower prices, greater
choices, better quality, while preserving their jobs at the
domestic firms.
At the day's end, the competition agency
accumulates a bundle of objectives, some of which conflict, such
as "[flreedom of trade, freedom of choice, access to markets, and
achievement of economic efficiency to maximise consumer
welfare." 163
Although many competition authorities would
approve a policy that aimed for the highest quality of goods and
services at the lowest cost, competition policy when actually
applied involves competing goals. For example, the goal of
promoting "open" competition and the freedom of firms and
individuals to participate in the market-also known as economic
freedom-competes with the goal of leaving entrenched firms free
to contract, inhibit market access, or not help their competitors.
In addition, the goal of ensuring a level playing field for small
161 Some competition agencies attributed their country's weak competition
culture in part to inexperienced generalist courts and authorities' and economic
agents' lack of acceptance of competition principles. Id. at x. The competition
agencies surveyed noted particular strong opposition to competition policy by
entrepreneurial associations, local governments, and labor unions. Id. at xi.
162 For example, certain developing nations noted that transnational companies
"enjoy advantages over domestic firms because of their size, reach and control over
intellectual property (technologies, brands, copyright etc)." CUTS, supra note 9, at
17. One necessity of competition policy, as envisioned by CUTS, is "to prevent these
firms from unfairly exploiting these advantages." Id. One cannot dismiss this as
third-world protectionism; Congress and the Supreme Court in the past shared this
concern. See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 275 (1966) ("Like the
Sherman Act in 1890 and the Clayton Act in 1914, the basic purpose of the 1950
Celler-Kefauver Act was to prevent economic concentration in the American
economy by keeping a large number of small competitors in business.").
163 CUTS, supra note 9, at i.
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and medium-sized enterprises competes with the goal of allowing
industrial concentration to achieve productive efficiencies.
Likewise, among the goals cited by the ICN-surveyed
agencies were protecting consumers, 164 encouraging creativity in
business activities, 165 achieving efficiency and fairness to small
and medium-sized enterprises, 166 and safeguarding jobs. 167 Thus,
both the United States and German competition authorities
identify the same general objective of assuring an effective
competitive process, but disagree over whether that process
168
should be aimed at protecting small enterprises.
It is noteworthy that the ICN's multiplicity of goals arose
from a small sample group of thirty-three competition agencies
discussing one parameter of competition law-monopolies. If the
survey is broadened beyond competition policy specialists to
other specialists, such as environmentalists and advocates of
international trade, labor, or human rights, the objectives will
multiply accordingly. The only way this broader group could
agree on a single objective is if the end were sufficiently openended, for example, promoting individual happiness and wellbeing. The broadly defined goal would embed their personal
values but point to no particular course of action. The reality
facing international firms today is, as the ICN recognized, such
divergence of
policy goals that prevail in one jurisdiction [that] are not
necessarily equally important in other jurisdictions. Predictable
and transparent policy objectives and enforcement standards in
a large number of jurisdictions will enable firms to better
anticipate the rules to which they are subject and adjust their
conduct accordingly. Greater transparency will, in turn, also
enable jurisdictions to learn each other's ideas and experiences,
thus preparing the ground for greater divergence
in the area of
169
objectives.
and
rules
conduct
unilateral

164

2007 ICN REPORT, supra note 19, at 7.

165

Id.
Id.
Id.

166
167

168 Shaped by the current Chicago School's orthodoxy, some antitrust policy
makers have rejected fairness to small enterprises or workers as an artifact of 1960s'
antitrust jurisprudence. See AMC REPORT, supra note 18, at 33-35.
169 2007 ICN REPORT, supra note 19, at 37.
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Not surprisingly, Congress, in enacting the Sherman Act, did
not endorse a unifying single objective. 170 With the Supreme
Court's gloss, the Sherman Act seeks to punish "unreasonable"
restraints of trade. The Sherman Act identifies neither these
restraints nor any specific objective to clarify which restraints
are unreasonable.
An "unreasonable" restraint ultimately
reflects a normative judgment of what is or is not socially
desirable. 171 Nor does the legislative intent of the Sherman Act
suggest a single objective. Although Judge Bork argued that
Congress's singular goal was to optimize efficiency, others noted
that economists were ambivalent at best when the Sherman Act
was enacted, 172 and that the Act encompassed political, noneconomic concerns. 173 It is no surprise that the Act's legislators,
like the developing countries' competition agencies today, voiced
multiple objectives for competition policy, as competition serves
different purposes for different constituents.
170 Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004), outlaws
every unreasonable "contract, combination.., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade."

Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004), makes it
unlawful for a company to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize ... trade or
commerce." Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000), prohibits mergers
and acquisitions when the effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly."
171 Similarly, the expression "competition on the merits," wrote the OECD, has
"never been satisfactorily defined," which has "led to a discordant body of case law
that uses an assortment of analytical methods," which in turn has "produced
unpredictable results and undermined the term's legitimacy along with policies that
are supposedly based on it." ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., POLICY BRIEF:
WHAT IS COMPETITION ON THE MERITS? 1 (2006), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/

10/27/37082099.pdf.
172 See George J. Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, 72 AM.
ECON. REV. 1, 3 (1982) ("A careful student of the history of economics would have
searched long and hard, on July 2 of 1890, the day the Sherman Act was signed by
President Harrison, for any economist who had ever recommended the policy of
actively combatting collusion or monopolization in the economy at large.").
173 See BORK, supra note 137, at 61-66. For further discussion of the Sherman
Act's legislative history, including Judge Bork's interpretation and the criticisms
thereto, see generally Daniel R. Ernst, The New Antitrust History, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 879, 882-83 (1990); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and
Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 871, 889-94 (1999). For the political dimensions of the Sherman Act,
see generally Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, supra note 142, at 106065; Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69
ANTITRUST L.J. 249, 258-59 (2001). As one antitrust scholar noted, "[a]ntitrust law
has been a long struggle over fear of power." Spencer Weber Waller, Bringing
Globalism Home: Lessons from Antitrust and Beyond, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 113, 117
(2000).
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Consequently, a uniform standard is readily available; the
trade-off is greater abstraction until one is left with the goal of
promoting an "effective competitive process" or "consumer
welfare." Like the idealist, one can discount the other purposes
as misdirected and adhere to a monolithic aim of competition and
social policy, such as promoting efficiency. But the risk is
marginalization. 174 Other than for an idealist, competition policy
cannot be reduced meaningfully to a single goal. "It is the
essence of the economic problem that the making of an economic
plan involves the choice between conflicting or competing endsdifferent needs of different people."'17 5 Competition officials,
ultimately, must recognize the existence of multiple goals and
values. 176
C.

Competition Policy Cannot Be Limited to Narrowly Defined
Economic Objectives

One common misconception of competition authorities and
scholars is to conflate the goals of competition policy and
advocacy with the goals of competition enforcement. 177 These
competition authorities advocate a single economic goal or
174

Two FTC economists observed that even if the agencies wrote position

papers against the proposed regulation, "these briefs are routinely ignored" and that
the politicians "will not necessarily embrace a program on the efficiency grounds
advocated by positive economic analysis." Rodriguez & Williams, supra note 6, at
230 & n.95. It may be, however, that the politicians view economics analysis as
normative, not positive.
175 HAYEK, supra note 51, at 106.
176 A recent Justice Department political appointee stated:
Competition will not always be the winning value in the legislative
process. That is okay; we should not become so excited about what we do for
a living that we lose sight of the fact that there are other values out there
that have an appropriate place in the political process. But competition
officials need to speak on behalf of competition and make clear that we are
not making our decisions on the basis of extraneous factors-cultural,
environmental, labor or otherwise political. Competition agencies need to
tell politicians when we think competition would demand a different
answer in the political process.
Pate, supra note 25, at 9-10.
177 For example, the former Assistant Attorney General argued:
Competition enforcers need to remain narrowly focused. There is a danger
in focusing within our discipline on anything other than efficiency and
consumer choices in making our decisions. As I will discuss later, in the
broader context of political decision-making process, where-I am careful to
say-there are other values that need to be taken into account, antitrust
agencies should be advocates for sound competition principles.
Id. at 2.
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complementary economic goals for competition policy, since
competition authorities are ill-equipped to deal with the "difficult
and politicized task of adjudicating between incompatible goals,"
which "creates uncertainty and ambiguit[ies] in the competition
178
regime."
Competition enforcement involves applying clear legal
principles to the relevant facts. One cornerstone of the rule of
law is that enforcement authorities apply the clear legal
prohibitions to particular facts with sufficient transparency,
uniformity, and predictability, so that private actors can
reasonably anticipate what actions would be prosecuted and
fashion their behavior accordingly. Businesses and individuals
need guidance of what behavior is unlawful, which should not be
left to the arbitrary discretion of the state to adjudge.
In contrast, the goals of competition policy and competition
advocacy are broader.
Rather than prosecuting individual
behavior, here the various stakeholders weigh what they want to
achieve through their competition policy, and decide how, by
choosing among many means, to achieve it. The means are
diverse, of which legal restraints on individual freedom is only
one. The caveat is that if competition authorities wish to achieve
their objectives in part through legal restraints, then with
respect to such legal restraints the rule of law applies. The goals
of competition policy, like tax policy, are much broader than the
goal of a specific prosecutorial mechanism to enforce that policy,
such as laws governing the reporting of income. Properly viewed
then, competition law enforcement represents one non-exclusive
mechanism to achieve the goals of a competition policy. The
goals of antitrust law enforcement are subsumed by, but not
necessarily co-extensive with, the goals of competition policy.
One competition official warned: "[T]he inclusion of other,
non-competition values is very dangerous, and we need to be very
careful with it. '' 179 He warned of the danger of getting involved
"in politically charged issues by reference to populism," which

178 CUTS, supra note 9, at 44-45; see also BORK, supra note 137, at 114-15
(indicating that legislature rather judiciary should decide issues where "a tradeoff in
values is required"); Randolph W. Tritell, InternationalAntitrust Convergence: A
Positive View, 19 ANTITRUST 25, 26 (2005) (advocating as part of "sound competition
policy" the "value of separating social and employment policy from competition
policy").
179 Pate, supra note 25, at 2.
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poses a "great danger of diluting our competition principles."' 18 0
If the competition authorities incorporate "extraneous social and
political values into [their] decision making," then their
"competition-based analysis will be polluted by values that, while
important, just do not belong in sound competition analysis. 18 1
These are legitimate concerns when criminally prosecuting an
individual or firm for an antitrust violation. These concerns
simply do not apply in the context of competition advocacy.
First, the critical assumption is that neoclassical economic
theory is a value-free science, inoculated from normative
judgments.
The competition authorities assume that their
conceptions of efficiency and "the laissez-faire market place are
pre-political and neutral." 18 2 However, once "we move from a
regime of zero transaction costs to one of positive transaction
costs," the legal system's fundamental importance quickly
becomes apparent.18 3 "Physical entities" are not being traded on
the market; rather, "the rights to perform certain actions," which
have been created by legal institutions.18 4 Thus, "the legal
system will have a profound effect on the working of the economic
system and may in certain respects be said to control it."185 Any
competition policy, developed in a world with transaction costs, is
built upon the legal institutions' normative judgments. Nor do
the positivists inquire about the current distribution of assets, or
the normative legal judgments that went into creating, assigning,
limiting, and protecting property rights. Competition policy
cannot be beyond the judgmental. Behind allocative efficiency's
fagade of positivism lie such moral questions as:
Given utilitarian welfare economic theory's ambivalence
about distributional effects, does economic efficiency
necessarily produce the just outcome? If not, what must
18 6
the state do?

180

Id. at 3.

181 Id. at 6.
182 See Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and
Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 591
(2002) (offering similar criticism of corporate law theorists seeking to separate
"corporate law from public law concerns").
183 Coase, supra note 72, at 717.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 717-18.
186 One study found that "[tihe welfare loss associated with monopoly power
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"

Is a vibrant market economy antagonistic or conducive
to society's moral progress, as measured by its tolerance,
18 7
support of the poor, etc.?

"

Is the market's "socio-political function" to "minimize[e]
the necessity of resorting to internal ethical constraints
on human behavior and/or external legal-governmental'18 8
political restrictions[?]"

"

Is there a "social mortgage" on private property, in that
"the very existence of the institution of private property
is to ensure that the basic needs of every [individual] are
1 89
met and sustained[?]"'

"

Is charging supracompetitive prices immoral?

"

Is wealth maximization descriptive or normative and
what role should the government play in fostering
wealth maximization?

A second criticism of treating competition policy as a positive
science is that competition as a process seeks to promote a
greater end, and the ranking of that end among many ends
ultimately represents a normative judgment. Policy makers
must determine to what extent (1) maximizing incentives for
wealth accumulation promotes total welfare; (2) that increase in
total welfare promotes happiness; and (3) other complementary,

was ...higher for low-income households," including households relying "on
government pensions and benefits for their principal source of income," compared

with high-income households. John Creedy & Robert Dixon, The Relative Burden of
Monopoly on Households with Different Incomes, 65 ECONOMICA 285, 291 (1998).

"The results suggest that, whatever the size of the absolute welfare loss resulting
from monopoly, there may be a substantial effect on the distribution of welfare." Id.
187 See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 90 (outlining how economic growth
renders a society more inclined toward many of the Enlightenment's conception of
moral progress, through greater openness, tolerance, mobility, and democracy).
188 James M. Buchanan, Good Economics-Bad Law, 60 VA. L. REV. 483, 486
(1974).
189 Letter from the Holy See to the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights of the WTO, Ethics Cannot Justify Fixing the Highest
Prices for Medicines, in L'OSSERVATORE ROMANO (Vatican City), July 11, 2001, at 9,
available at http://www.catholicculture.org/library/view.cfm?recnum=3966&longdesc
(presenting the Holy See's stance on the pharmaceutical industry's responsibility to
provide affordably priced medications). For more on the social mortgage on capital,
see generally CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE (David J.
O'Brien & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 2004).
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or more effective, means will increase total welfare. Michael
Porter, for example, argues that
[w]hile protecting short-run consumer welfare measured by
price-cost margins is ... important .... productivity growth
through innovation, where innovation is defined broadly to
include not only products, but also processes and methods of
management... [are] the single most important determinant of
long-term consumer welfare and a nation's standard of living. 190
Under any policy, who will be left behind, and what social net
will protect them?
A third criticism of treating competition policy as a positive
science is that individuals do not delineate between economic and
non-economic activities, which are necessarily intertwined.
Consumers and workers do not enter the marketplace with a
blank slate.
Instead, years of socialization, and the
internalization of social, moral, ethical, and legal norms have
already occurred. "When consumers and entrepreneurs begin
participating in and exchanging on the market and competing
with each other, they are already socialized individuals, sharing
a large number of social rules."'191 These ethical, moral, and
social norms invariably affect economic behavior, so "when
economic and non-economic activity are intermixed, noneconomic activity affects the costs and the available techniques
92
for economic activity."1
Fourth, inoculating a competition policy's objectives from
populism is to inoculate it from democracy. Competition policy
makers must articulate how their conception of competition will
improve living conditions overall and for different constituencies.
If the goal of "competition" is not the general improvement of
society, what exactly are we advocating? The free market is not
an independent constitutionally-protected actor, but whatever
the majority wants it to be, subject to any constitutional
limitations. For example, if the majority wants to prevent a bigbox retailer from entering their New England town, and
voluntarily deprive themselves of lower prices and oversized
190Porter, supra note 93, at 157.
191 Mantzavinos, supra note 65, at 6.
192 Mark Granovetter, The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes, 19

J. ECON. PERSP. 33, 35 (2005). Personal contacts may engender trust, lowering
transaction costs. See id. at 38 (citing studies). Social interactions, such as
friendships, may also lead to certain desirable economic outcomes, like lowering
search costs to hire new employees. See id. at 41.
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parking lots with undersized trees, should a competition
authority override the majority for the sake of promoting
efficiency?
"The greater danger," warned John Kenneth
Galbraith, "is the subordination of belief to the needs of the
modern industrial system."'193
One intuitive objective of
competition policy is to ensure the prudent utilization of society's
limited resources to "maximize total economic welfare."'194 As a
general matter, we do not want our economy to oversupply us
with beans and undersupply us with carrots. Industrial policy is
a mechanism to improve everyone's welfare by striving for Pareto
optimality. But at what point do we become subservient to this
industrial policy? It may be when we permit losses to a growing
minority of individuals on the belief that the economy will
eventually distribute the gains and losses fairly. It may be when
we measure by tablespoons our wants and needs, our educational
system, and our social, ethical, legal, and moral norms to accord
with this industrial policy, until everything furthers that end.
Do we want "the discipline required by the industrial system" to
become "the conventional morality of the community[?]"' 19 5 Or do
we instead want a stroll in the park? At some point, society may
recognize market failure, or even absent such failure, accord
greater weight to aesthetic or non-economic goals.
Fifth, utilitarian welfare economics are silent on their
distributional effects. 196 What if the chosen competition policy
193 John Kenneth Galbraith, Liberty, Happiness ...and the Economy, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, June 1967, at 61, reprinted in 150 Years of the Atlantic, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Apr. 2006, at 44, 46.
194 Kolasky, What Is Competition?, supranote 55, at 35.
195 Galbraith, supra note 193, at 47.
196 One study examined child poverty rates both before and after government
intervention for sixteen developed countries. Excluding the United States, the
average rate of child poverty without governmental assistance was 21.1 percent.
Sylvia A, Allegretto, U.S. Government Does Relatively Little to Lessen Child Poverty
Rates, ECON. SNAPSHOTS (Econ. Policy Inst., Wash., D.C.), July 19, 2006, http://
www.epi.org/content.cfm/webfeatures-snapshots_20060719. "Before [distributional]
taxes and transfers, the United States had one of the highest market-based rates of
child poverty in 2000: 26.6%. Four other countries-New Zealand, France, the
United Kingdom, and Ireland-had comparably high market rates of child poverty."
Id. After taxes, including refundable taxes and distributional wealth transfers, the
United States still had the highest level of child poverty. See id.
On average, government taxes and transfers in the other 15 countries
reduced child poverty significantly-by about half-dropping 10.4
percentage points to 10.7%. France had the largest redistributive decline of
20.2 percentage points to a child poverty rate of 7.5%. By contrast, the U.S.
rate was reduced by just 4.7 percentage points to 21.9%-by far the highest
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improves total welfare, by mainly improving the lot of the
wealthiest one percent, but at a cost to the poorest ten percent?
Under social contract theory, individuals would not consent ex
ante to such utilitarian policies.
In seeking to inoculate
competition policy from other concerns, some of which are of the
policy's making, these competition officials invariably point to
other legislation to cure their policy's ills. Ask not what
competition policy can do to increase happiness or reduce income
disparity, ask Congress instead.
Congress can redistribute
wealth, through income taxation, for example, but will face
political pressures from its financial backers. 197 Pointing to the
legislative process to ameliorate the distributional effects of one's
competition policy also undercuts the utility of competition
advocacy. Why should a legislator listen to a competition
advocate, if its competition policy aggravates or is divorced from
the ills?
For example, if the particular competition policy
increases the wealth gap, what value would a competition
advocate have in arguing for not taxing the rich, as this dulls
incentives? Invariably, it breeds more anticompetitive restraints,
as legislators are free to ignore competition policy to secure some
greater end of happiness, welfare, and safety.

child poverty rate of all 16 developed countries, even after government

assistance.
Id. (emphasis omitted). Moreover, "the poverty rates for blacks (24.7%) and
Hispanics (21.9%) were more than twice that of whites (10.8%)." MISHAL R.
LAWRENCE ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2006-2007 (2006), available at

http://www.stateofworkingamerica.org/news/SWA06Facts-Poverty.pdf.
197 While the competition authorities can point to federal tax legislation to effect
wealth distribution, tax officials can respond that such tax hikes could undermine
competitiveness. See Higher Taxes Will Stifle US Entrepreneurship,' FIN. TIMES
(London), July 12, 2007, at 6. For a discussion on progressive taxation generally, see
Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New
Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905 (1987); W. Blum & H. Kalvern,
Jr., The Uneasy Case for ProgressiveTaxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952); Jeffrey
A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Consideration of the Philosophical
Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 21 (1995); Dan
Throop Smith, High Progressive Tax Rates: Inequity and Immorality, 20 U. FLA. L.
REV. 451 (1968); Lawrence Zelenak & Kemper Moreland, Can the GraduatedIncome

Tax Survive Optimal Tax Analysis, 53 TAX L. REV. 51 (1999).
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Sixth, this "not-my-job" mentality promotes parochialism. 198
Much has been praised about the division of labor.1 99 No doubt,
such specialization enables the ever-increasing complexity in the
manufacturing and services sectors. But the leading attorneys in
the twenty-first century will not be those with the greatest
mastery in their narrow field of expertise. 20 0 Rather, they will be
problem solvers, identifying issues across disciplines, and
assisting their clients in finding answers to those problems.
Similarly, competition authorities cannot furrow deeper in their
field, ignorant of the issues or concerns in other fields. Instead,
when "pressing problem[s]" arise, "current individual disciplines
[may] prove inadequate to solve that problem. '20 1 Even if the
specialist feels confident that her specialized knowledge can
provide the answer, other specialists may disagree, believing that
their disciplines carry the solution.
The surveyed "ICN members considered that the most
important obstacle to their advocacy work surges from the
As Judge Wood observed:
Related to this observation is ... that the generalist judge is less likely to
become the victim of regulatory capture than her specialized counterpart,
despite the best of intentions on the latter's side. If one never emerges from
the world of antitrust, to take one field that I know well, one can lose sight
of the broader goals that lie behind this area of law; one can forget the ways
in which it relates to other fields of law like business torts, breaches of
contract, and consumer protection, and more broadly the way this law fits
into the loose "industrial policy" of the United States. Economic mumbojumbo is already prevalent in the field, but lawyers talk of the trade-off
between the deadweight loss "triangle" and the income transfer "rectangle"
at their peril in front of a judge who does not live and breathe the field.
Specialists need to emerge from their cocoons from time to time and find
out how their smaller world fits in with the larger one.
Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50 SMU L. REV. 1755,
198

1767 (1997).

As Adam Smith remarked:
[Tihe improvement of the dexterity of the workman necessarily increases
the quantity of the work he can perform, and the division of labour, by
reducing every man's business to some one simple operation, and by
making this operation the sole employment of his life, necessarily increases
very much the dexterity of the workman.

199

ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 15 (Kathryn Sutherland ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1776) [hereinafter
SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS].
200 Indeed, legal outsourcing to India has spread to more analytical functions,
and is estimated to become a $4 billion industry by 2015. See Erin Marie Daly, Legal
Outsourcing Market Booms in India, COMPETITION LAW360 (N.Y.), Jan. 5, 2007,

http://competition.law360.com/Secure/ViewArticle.aspx?id=15939.
201 See HOWARD GARDNER, FIVE MINDS FOR THE FUTURE 58 (2006).
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different objectives and opinions held by other Governmental
authorities. '20 2 Seeking to inoculate competition goals from
populism will not bridge this divide. One cannot effectively
advocate competition without considering other societal goals,
policies, or populist ideals. Because competition policy affects all
facets of life, it invites at a minimum a dialogue with other
specialties. Although a "multiperspectival approach recognizes
that different analytic perspectives can contribute to the
elucidation of an issue or problem," ' 20 3 such interdisciplinary
synthesis is missing from competition policy today. Lawyers at
the DOJ's Antitrust Division infrequently interact with its sister
agency, the FTC, much less other federal agencies.
When
deciding upon the objectives of competition, and the means to
achieve that end, policy makers must take a broader view.
Competition authorities must not only have "due regard for the
history, culture, politics, and institutions of the affected
nations." 20 4 To succeed, competition policy must operate in the
same sphere of these other "populist" social policies, goals, and
norms. Competition advocates must ask: How consistent are
their policy's objectives with other societal objectives and ethical,
moral, and social norms?
Rather than being fixed, the objectives of competition policy
evolve as the needs of society change. As one FTC official noted,
"[p]reserving the ability to experiment with different rules and
procedures and to adapt them to the local environment is critical
to enable competition law and policy to evolve, as has occurred
throughout the history of the U.S. antitrust laws." 20 5 The
objectives of competition policy will be continually shaped by
many factors, including: the strength and needs of varying
stakeholders; geography, as in situations where a country seeks
to improve its competitiveness in international trade; its preexisting economy (for example, many developing countries may
have high levels of public ownership and government
participation in the economy, which may suggest different goals
than for a country with low levels of state ownership and

202
203
204

ICN ADVOCACY REPORT, supra note 1, at 72.
GARDNER, supra note 201, at 71.
Lande, Professor Waller's Un-American Approach to Antitrust, supra note 9,

at 139.
205

Tritell, supra note 178, at 25.
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minimal governmental participation); 206 the legal institutions in
place; and the existing legal, social, ethical, and moral norms in
that society.
D. Rejoicing over Multiple Goals
So how does a competition advocate respond to multiple
economic
and
non-economic
goals from the
different
stakeholders?
As the old appellate advocacy line goes,
"Rejoice." 20 7 Rather than an obstruction to achieving an idealized
competition policy, these multiple goals reflect the various
stakeholders' pressing interests and concerns.
As Thurman
Arnold observed over sixty years ago, "[t]he antitrust problem
must be brought to the public and not reserved for the abstract
consideration of the lawyer or the economist."20 8 So rejoice when
different stakeholders actively participate in shaping the
objectives of competition policy.
One does not develop a
competition culture by cutting off the debate and entrusting
policy to the experts. Such fiat is a recipe for disaster. As
studies of General Motors managers found, compliance with
orders was not self-executing. Division heads resisted policies if
they had no input in creating these directives. 209 So too in
dealing with the various stakeholders, one wants to enlist the
consumer organizations, business interests, labor, media,
academics, and other stakeholders for their input: The more the
stakeholders own the idea, the greater the likelihood of
endorsement.

See CUTS, supra note 9, at 14.
This is attributed to John W. Davis, a member of the United States House of
Representatives and the Democratic Party nominee for President in 1924, who
argued many cases before the Supreme Court:
Rejoice when the Court asks questions. And again I say unto you, rejoice!
If the question does nothing more it gives you assurance that the court is
not comatose and that you have awakened at least a vestigial interest.
Moreover a question affords you your only chance to penetrate the mind of
the court, unless you are an expert in face reading, and to dispel a doubt as
soon as it arises. This you should be able to do if you know your case and
have a sound position.... If you value your argumentative life do not evade
or shuffle or postpone, no matter how embarrassing the question may be or
how much it interrupts the thread of your argument.
John W. Davis, The Argument of an Appeal, 26 A.B.A. J. 895, 897 (1940).
208 Thurman Arnold, Antitrust Law Enforcement, Past and Future, in THE
SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 10 (1940).
206
207

209 Granovetter, supra note 192, at 43.

2008]

BETTER COMPETITIONADVOCACY

1009

Competition policy in a democracy will never be captured by
a single economic goal. At times, society may restrict some forms
of competition, such as by granting intellectual property rights to
210
stimulate further other forms of competition, like innovation.
At other times, competition policy responds to world events, such
as the rise of fascism. Whatever its determinants, the objectives
of competition policy, like economies generally, will continue to
evolve.
Competition policy is sufficiently vibrant to have
multiple and evolving goals of varying priority, not all of which
need to be consistent. To be successful, as the developing
countries recount from their experience, competition policy must
extend beyond its coterie of experts and be supported by other
211
stakeholders.
III. How To GET THERE: HOW ARE THE GOALS OF COMPETITION
ACHIEVED?

In presenting the means for obtaining their policy's
objectives, some competition authorities present a stark
dichotomy: a centrally planned economy versus a laissez faire
economy with no or little government involvement. 212 Similarly,
if the choice were grilling a sirloin steak in one's backyard versus
waiting in line for Russian meatloaf, few would choose the latter.
The dogmatic laissez faire adherents view the competitive
process as a self-initiating process as individuals pursue their
self-interest. Competition will arise naturally as the government
restraints recede. Competition is self-regulating, and leads in
the long run to a competitive equilibrium. Market distortions are
temporary. Private restraints that impede competition dissipate,
and the market returns to its optimally efficient level. "Managed
competition" has a negative connotation-smacking of socialism
when a central decision maker seeks to displace these natural
phenomena. Invariably, proponents cite a couple of sentences
21 3
from one of Adam Smith's books.
210 But these "incentives for innovation do not necessarily require restrictions on
competition in production-they may be non-commercial, as in the scientific
research, or provided by other measures such as R&D subsidies." Vickers, supra note

53, at 4.
211 See CUTS, supra note 9, at 44.
212 For example, a former FTC Chairman asked, "[s]hould the economy be based
on competition through free enterprise and open markets, on command-and-control
regulation, or on public or collective ownership?" Muris, supra note 136, at 364.
213 "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that
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This conception of competition, which is inconsistent with
Adam Smith's, 2 14 lacks an empirical basis. Nor can it be deduced
from a model of perfect
competition, with its assumptions of
"rational" behavior. 2 15 That model says nothing about what
institutions, if any, are needed to support these "rational" profitmaximizers. Absent legal and informal social institutions, some
rudimentary forms of barter could exist, but not a self-regulating,
self-initiating competitive process sufficient to increase overall
welfare. There is "no system that could be rationally defended"
'
where the state would "just do nothing. "216
The other extreme occurs when the government does
everything, as these central planners demand a "central direction
of all economic activity according to a single plan, laying down
how the resources of society should be 'consciously directed' to
serve particular ends in a definite way." 217 The economic failures
of socialist countries discredit this conception of the competitive
process.
The ever-evolving conceptions of competition and the
interaction between the state and private actors, however,
foreclose any stark dichotomy.
Effective competition, as
Friedrich Hayek proposed, can be "created" and generally
requires certain kinds of government action. 218
Shaped by
numerous combinations of legal, ethical, or social norms, the
competitive process is not restricted to where the government
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest." SMITH, WEALTH
OF NATIONS, supra note 199, at 22. "[B]y directing that industry in such a manner as
its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in
this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was
no part of his intention." Id. at 291-92.
214 Adam Smith believed that government had an important role to play in
markets, including enforcing contracts, granting patents and copyrights to
encourage inventions and new ideas, providing public goods, such as roads and
bridges, which, he assumed, would not be worthwhile for individuals to provide. The
Concise Encyclopedia of Economics: Library of Economics and Liberty, Biography of
Adam Smith, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/smith.html (last visited Mar.
30, 2008).
215 Although no uniform definition has coalesced, rational choice theory
generally posits that people, either individually or collectively, "maximize their
utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal amount of
information and other inputs in a variety of markets." GARY S. BECKER, THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976). The theory assumes that
actors are rational, have willpower, and will act in their own self-interest.
216 HAYEK, supra note 51, at 88.
217
218

Id. at 85.
Id. at 86.
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centrally plans all facets of the economy, as in socialism, or does
nothing, as in laissez-faire economy, but the right mixture for
that industry, at that time period, in that social setting.
Managed competition ultimately is a course between the
extremes of: (1) "dogmatic laissez faire attitude" with its faith in
unregulated market forces, 219 and (2) socialism with its faith in
the central economic planner to allocate goods and services to
achieve the desired end. A liberal argument-as Hayek and
others recognized-is that government, social, and private
institutions can work together for competition to work
beneficially.
Rather than veering to either extreme or to a middle course,
competition authorities must understand first the actual
competitive dynamics in particular markets, and the government
institutions necessary to promote competition in that market. In
considering institutional designs, one size does not fit all
countries or all industries therein. 220 Before reaching into their
toolkit, competition policy makers must better understand:
(1) the market's competitive dynamics, (2) what tools are
available, and (3) how the tools work in various combinations. It
is unlikely that these empirical analyses will lead to any unifying
theory of competition.
The complexity of the competitive
dynamics, including the number and changing character of the
variables that affect it, may ultimately humble us about the
deficiencies of our understanding, and make us better
22 1
competition advocates.
A.

To Promote Such Competition, How Can the Government
Help?

If competition is viewed as a dynamic interplay among
government institutions, private individuals, and informal
norms, it is unrealistic to view government institutions existing
outside a free market. 222 Rather than an exogenous and mostly
Id. at 85.
See WORLD BANK, supra note 32, at 4.
221 Indeed when the FTC had empirical substantiation for its policy position, it
was more effective with policy makers. "These filings tended to be the most
convincing work of the [competition advocacy] program because the empirical work
made the filings more valuable and more credible than they might otherwise be."
Cooper et al., supra note 7, at 1108 n.60.
222 Government regulation at times creates the market, such as the market for
pollution rights. Among the emission trading systems are the S02 trading system
219
220
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anticompetitive force, legal institutions--or the lack thereofinteract with, affect, and shape the competitive process. They
can support a "productive and growing market economy.., like
'223
the hidden steel scaffolding that supports a building.
These legal institutions can be coercive, by restraining
certain behavior, or non-coercive, by increasing price
transparency, reducing regulatory entry barriers, fostering procompetitive activities through tax credits, or informing social
norms and attitudes. Absent these legal institutions, one cannot
simply open the door and wait for the "invisible hand" to appear.
"An effective competitive system needs an intelligently designed
and continuously adjusted legal framework as much as any
other."224 The job for the competition agencies of developing
countries, therefore, "is not to sustain or support competitive
markets, but to create them. ' 22 5 The issue is how and when can
institutions assist--or deter-in attaining the competition
policy's goals. The World Bank examined the various legal
institutions that can promote competition, and this Article will
focus on five: (1) rule of law, (2) competitive marketplace of ideas,
(3) ethical, social, and moral norms, (4) adaptive political system,
and (5) more vibrant and informed antitrust enforcement.
How the Rule of Law Promotes Competition
A "key feature of all industrial market systems," found the
World Bank, "is a strong state that can support a formal legal
system that complements existing norms and a state that itself
respects the law and refrains from arbitrary actions." 226 Among
the traditional legal institutions, which the World Bank
identified as central in supporting a market economy, are:
(1) defining, protecting, and enforcing property and contractual
rights, (2) assisting in the quick and fair resolution of disputes of
1.

under the "Acid Rain Program" framework created by the 1990 Amendments to the
Clean Air Act. See U.S.Envtl. Prot. Agency, Acid Rain Program Allowance Auction
(last
Fact Sheet, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/trading/factsheet-auction.html.
visited Mar. 30, 2008); see also Europa, Emission Trading Scheme, http://ec.
europa.eulenvironmentclimat/emission.htm. (last visited Mar. 30, 2008) (discussing
a scheme in which all twenty-five member states of the European Union
participate).
223 Bruce M. Owen, Imported Antitrust, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 441, 442 (2004)
(book review).
224 HAYEK, supra note 51, at 88.
225 CUTS, supra note 9, at 61.
226 WORLD BANK, supra note 32, at 4.
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such rights, (3) facilitating the creation of corporate governance
structures to promote investment, (4) providing frameworks for
operating financial systems, raising capital, and providing for
insolvency, and (5) facilitating international trade. 227 Underlying
all these legal mechanisms is the rule of law.
Few dispute the rule of law's critical role in supporting our
economy,
generally,
and
with respect
to prohibiting
anticompetitive behavior. 228 If the competition laws create the
rules of the game, outlining with sufficient clarity what is
impermissible, then all competitors can rely on these rules in
fashioning their behavior and predicting their competitors'
behavior. The rule of law, if it applies at all, must protect and
punish all who are subject to it. Otherwise, a competitor has
little incentive to abide by these particular rules and incur costs
thereby, while its rival cheats and gains a competitive advantage.
227 The World Bank, among others, has found that exposure to international
markets played a key role in promoting competition in domestic markets. One study
compared productivity in Germany, Japan, and the United States and found that
"international competition ha[d] a greater impact than regional or local competition
in raising productivity because international competition exposes countries to the
most efficient production techniques." Id. at 142. Canada's and South Africa's
competition agencies cited as a specific objective of their competition laws is to
"promot[e] [their country's] competitiveness in international markets." 2007 ICN
REPORT, supra note 19, at 20. Another benefit of promoting international trade is its
introduction of innovation into the domestic market, fostering cooperation, the
further division of labor, and efficiency. By injecting innovation into domestic
markets and promoting the free flow of information, international trade can also
pressure the domestic government to provide certain institutions or eliminate other
institutional barriers to competition that hinder the domestic company's
competitiveness. WORLD BANK, supra note 32, at 143. Others have questioned the
neoliberal orthodoxy that countries should "privatise state-owned enterprises,
maintain low inflation, reduce the size of government, balance the budget, liberalise
trade, deregulate foreign investment and capital markets, make the currency
convertible, reduce corruption and privatise pensions." Ha-Joon Chang, Protecting
the Global Poor, PROSPECT, July 2007, available at http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/pdfarticle.php?id=9653. Instead, they argue that this orthodoxy
works with countries at comparable levels of development, and developing countries
may require some levels of protection, as the United States, Japan, Korea, and other
developed countries did. Indeed, the prescriptions under neoclassical economic
theory may constrain policy options, and hamper development. See generally HA-

JOON CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS: RICH NATIONS, POOR POLICIES AND THE THREAT TO
THE DEVELOPING WORLD (2007); ERIK S. REINERT, How RICH COUNTRIES GOT
RICH ... AND WHY POOR COUNTRIES STAY POOR (2007).
228 Seeking to foster innovation
through heterogeneity, selection, and
propagation, the state-through the rule of law-may seek to foreclose certain
socially harmful activities: The state, for example, does not want to promote the
continual introduction of novel fraudulent practices.
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Any failure to enforce uniformly the rules of the contest will
Nor should the complainant's
invite competitors to cheat.
Any competitor, customer, supplier, or
identity matter:
government agency should enjoin any infraction thereto.
The antitrust laws protect competition and all market
participants from anticompetitive abuses. Upon reflection, one
recognizes the banality of a U.S. antitrust mantra: That the
purpose of the antitrust laws is "the protection of competition, not
competitors."229
Inexplicably, the AMC claimed as "[m]ost
important, [that] antitrust case law has become grounded in the
related principles that antitrust protects competition, not
230
competitors, and that it does so to ensure consumer welfare."
The suspicion is that if the competitor complains, the challenged
action is pro-competitive, as the competitor's incentives (e.g.,
concern about rival's aggressive behavior and efficiency) are
misaligned with the consumers' interests (e.g., lower prices) or
society's interest (e.g., allocative and productive efficiency). This
suspicion is valid occasionally, but not always.
First, "where force can be used, law is not needed." 23 1 Firms
with market power may have little utility for the courts to
address violations of the competition laws.
Instead, these
dominant firms would favor increasing the barriers for
challenging anticompetitive behavior, as they are rarely
victimized by another competitor. Even if the smaller firm were
an annoyance, the powerful entrenched firm may resort to
quicker, lower-cost means to resolve their competition disputes:
lobbying the government for relief, for example, venturing with
or acquiring a financial interest in the smaller firm to increase

229 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2724
(2007) (quoting Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338 (1990)).
230 AMC REPORT, supra note 18, at 4. The AMC argued that "[tihe adoption of
this principle represented a marked change in the direction of antitrust law." Id. at
34. The AMC neither addresses the rule of law nor how it should protect consumers
and competitors alike. Instead it assumed that protecting small firms "can mean a
less efficient economy in which consumers must pay higher prices." Id. at 34.
231 In addressing the Spartans, the Athenians were responding to their
reputation of being litigious, as they resolved their contractual disputes with their
allies through the courts. They noted the irony that an individual's "indignation, it
seems, is more excited by legal wrong than by violent wrong; the first looks like
being cheated by an equal, the second like being compelled by a superior." THE

LANDMARK THUCYDIDES: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 44

(Robert B. Strassler ed., 1996).
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mechanisms to punish any unwanted behavior, or retaliating
232
with anticompetitive measures.
Entrants with potentially disruptive technologies may not
have comparable alternatives. Although a dominant firm may
use litigation strategically to impose costs on its rivals, an
entrant with limited resources turns to the courts when it is the
only viable-or least costly-alternative.
An independent
judiciary and the rule of law may be the only protections left for
smaller competitors. The World Bank evaluated the literature
and found that that "the primary beneficiaries of well-functioning
commercial courts are new, small firms unaffiliated with either
private business groups or the state, run by those who do not
233
necessarily have established social connections."
Studies on commercial litigation in Italy, Romania, Russia,
Slovakia, Ukraine, and Vietnam show that newly created
private enterprises, which do not have established supplier and
customer networks or significant market power, are most likely
to resort to the use of commercial courts. Older, especially
state-owned,
enterprises are often able to settle disputes out of
4
court.

23

Second, the goal for any competition policy is a legal system
that adjudicates cases "cheaply, quickly, and fairly, while
maximizing access." 235 The Court notes that its legal standards
236
may increase litigation costs by promoting "frivolous" suits.
One disturbing trend in the United States is the Supreme Court's
restricting access to-or increasing the party's cost in accessingthe courts for anticompetitive conduct. Fewer private federal
antitrust cases have been brought since the Court's decision in
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.237 The Court notes
232 One could question this belief as U.S.-centric in assuming the efficiency of
the common law and that this process can be transplanted elsewhere in the world.
Corrupt, incompetent, or inefficient courts can create anticompetitive entry barriers.
233 WORLD BANK, supra note 32, at 119.
234

Id.

235

Id. at 124.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2718

236

(2007).

237 In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977), the
Court retreated from its per se standard of liability for nonprice vertical restraints,
and adopted the rule-of-reason standard argued by the Chicago School antitrust
adherents. For a chart reflecting the number of private antitrust cases filed annually
between 1975 and 2006 in federal district court, see SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE (31st ed.), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebooklpdf/t541
2006.pdf. The following chart has been recreated from the Sourcebook of Criminal
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that antitrust litigation is expensive, time-consuming, and at
times beyond the ken of a generalist court. 238 But, the Court has
supplied the murky standards of anticompetitive conduct. While
narrowing the scope of its rules of per se illegality, the Court has
239
not offered in return a workable rule-of-reason standard.
Litigants and trial courts are subjected to a nebulous weighing
standard that consumes armies of attorneys for years in
discovery. 240 The Court compounded the problem through its
implied immunities. The Court's state action doctrine enables
special interest groups to solicit shelter from state legislatures.
With its "varied and controversial interpretations," this implied
immunity promotes at times anticompetitive competitive conduct
that hinders consumers and the politically less powerful. 241 As
Justice Statistics Online (31st ed.):

V

V

A

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 n.6 (2007).
Opting for its rule-of-reason standard, the Court overturned its per se rule
for vertical, non-price restraints in Continental, 433 U.S. at 58-59, for maximum
resale price maintenance in State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 3 (1997), and for
minimum resale price maintenance in Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2725.
240 In Leegin, the Court asserted that the rule-of-reason standard is now the
"accepted" standard for testing whether a practice is an unreasonable restraint of
trade. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712. Under this standard, the fact finder "weighs all of
the circumstances of a case." Id. Among the non-exclusive factors for the fact-finder
to weigh are "specific information about the relevant business," the "restraint's
history, nature, and effect," and "[w]hether the businesses involved [with the
restraint] have market power." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
241 TASK FORCE ON THE FED. ANTITRUST AGENCIES, AM. BAR ASS'N, THE STATE
OF FEDERAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 42 (2001) ("State action immunity drives a
large hole in the framework of the nation's competition laws."); Majoras, supra note
7, at 1179; Muris, supra note 136, at 367-68, 375-77. Professor Waller argued that
the state action doctrine, which is inconsistent with the kind of regulatory reform
238

239
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Professor Waller argued, "At a minimum, a coherent legislative
decision would be welcome instead of the ad hoc development of a
judicial immunity so otherwise alien to our antitrust
experience."' 242 Finally, in recent years, the Court readily has
ceded antitrust laws' consumer protections to the politically
unaccountable independent agencies or self-regulatory agencies,
which under the Chicago School are especially prone to
243
regulatory capture.
Given the dangers of central planning generally, it is ironic
that the Supreme Court has done more to define the free market

and the legal institutions that

shape

it.244

Advocating

competition policy requires evaluating the deficiencies of, and
drafting legislative improvements to, the current antitrust
standards.
2.

How an Adaptive Political System Can Promote Competition
Competition advocacy often targets state-owned enterprises
sheltered from the competitive process.
These enterprises
include railroads, mail, telecommunications, and energy. In
addition, similar concerns apply to other state-owned enterprises,
such as the courts, administrative agencies, and legislatures.
The more insulated these government officials are to public
that the United States normally promotes in the international fora, restricts the
United States' ability to obtain as great a package of concessions from other nations.
Waller, supra note 173, at 124-25; AMC REPORT, supra note 18, at ix ("[C]ourts
should adhere more closely to Supreme Court state action precedents. It
recommends that the doctrine should not apply where the effects of conduct are not
predominantly intrastate. In addition, the doctrine should equally apply to
governmental entities when they act as participants in the marketplace.").
242 Waller, supra note 173, at 127.
243 For example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's merger review
policies were recently criticized for relying on data supplied by the regulated
entities, rather than conducting its own independent fact gathering and analysis of
market definition. Sara Stefanini, Think Tank Urges FERC To Reform Merger
Policies, COMPETITION LAW360 (N.Y.), Mar. 15, 2007, http://competition.law360.
com/Secure/ViewArticle.aspx?id=20553. Perhaps sector regulators may not really
understand the prevailing competition policy and do a second rate job when they try
to do so.
244 Shaping competition policy is an unsuitable role for the Court. Although the
Court may invite the views of amici, there is no assurance of a full and informed
debate among stakeholders. The Court deliberates privately. What results is an
opinion, which the Justices need not publicly defend. These Justices, who are neither
appointed nor approved with the direct input of the public, are not accountable for
their poor competition policies, nor can they sua sponte correct their errors until
another case presents itself.

1018

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:951

dissatisfaction, the less accountable they become, the more prone
to corruption, and the less likely to change.
Some may decry the interventionist drift of various agencies,
and call instead for a centrally coordinated planner. But too
much central planning engenders the risk of gridlock and
regulatory capture: "[W]here everything is done through the
bureaucracy, nothing to which the bureaucracy is really adverse
can be done at all."24 5 Too little coordination, and one loses the
benefits of division of labor and a greater risk of inconsistent
legal standards. Finding this balance of securing the advantages
of centralized power and intelligence without the government
centrally planning too much of human affairs is, as John Stuart
Mill observed, "one of the most difficult and complicated
246
questions in the art of government."
To what extent are the government institutions responsive to
the public? As the Chicago School and public choice theorists
warn, and the protections for Italian barbers, German
economists, and Kentucky real estate agents reflect, special
interest groups, at times, solicit the government to further their
parochial interests to the public's detriment. At other times,
special interest groups petition the government to improve legal
institutions, such as removing restraints that hinder them
compared to foreign competitors. 247 For example, they may call
245 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 172 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds.,
Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859).
246 Id. at 173. This Article suggests several checks on the regulatory agencies,
including greater emphasis on the rule of law, less unfettered discretion by the
agencies, and a vibrant marketplace of ideas. Interestingly, the two competition
agencies can exert a competitive restraint on the other. The FTC and the DOJ's
Antitrust Division currently compete for civil investigations and can serve as a
benchmark for activity, such as periods when one agency brings fewer civil cases
than the other, or reform. For example, the FTC Commissioner earlier articulated
several important reforms for the competition agencies, such as periodic
comprehensive reviews of the effectiveness of the competition agencies, post-merger
review, greater transparency of agency decisions and enforcement activities, and
greater empirical analysis of the competitive process. William E. Kovacic, Gen.
Counsel, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Achieving Better Practices in the Design of
Competition Policy Institutions, Remarks Before the Seoul Competition Forum 2-5
(Apr. 20, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/040420comppolicyinst.pdf. If the
FTC implements these reforms, the Antitrust Division would likely undertake
similar measures. But two competing bureaucracies, with the attendant costs, is not
the ideal long term solution.
247 Industry participants, for example, may seek greater convergence
in
accounting and securities norms between the United States and other developing
nations, providing new institutions to foster private trade with other countries, and

2008]

BETTER COMPETITIONADVOCACY

1019

on the administration to follow Europe's steps to enact
mechanisms to address global warming, since, as one business
group warned, "in the absence of strong federal leadership there
is a risk that US business may get left behind, losing ground
against competitors in the rapidly growing global market for lowcarbon solutions." 248 Legal institutions, like private firms, must
continually adapt to the competitive environment. 249 Exploration
by private economic agents is useless if the government
institutions hinder, or are passive to, this exploration. To learn
eliminating regulations that have outlived their utility. See, e.g., Bertrand Benoit,
EU & US to Begin Single Market Push, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 20, 2007, at 6
(noting that the E.U. and the United States are commencing initiatives to
"harmonize regulations, norms and technical standards in up to'40 economic and
industrial sectors," including the "automotive industry, where regulatory
incompatibilities are responsible for 10 per cent of the cost of developing and
producing new cars"); Jeremy Grant, SEC Could Trial Global Pact on Listings, FIN.
TIMES (London), Mar. 20, 2007, at 15 (stating that the SEC is considering a pilot
program with other foreign regulators whereby "foreign initial public offerings could
be marketed and sold in the United States without SEC approval if approved by a
regulator abroad with 'equivalent' rules"). The Committee on Capital Markets
Regulation, an independent group led by Harvard Law Professor Hal S. Scott, Dean
of Columbia Business School Glenn Hubbard, and Chairman of the Brookings
Institution John L. Thornton, recently highlighted its areas of concern about the
competitiveness of U.S. capital markets and outlined thirty-two recommendations
including improvements to government institutions to enhance that competitiveness.
See LUIGI ZINGALES ET AL., COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 7-21 (2006),

http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee-InterimReportREV2.pdf.
248 Edward Luce, US Investors Join Businesses to Call for Emission Cut, FIN.
TIMES (London), Mar. 20, 2007, at 9 (quoting statement issued by the group
Investors and Business for U.S. Climate Action).
249 For example, the DOJ may have successfully prosecuted an antitrust
violation years ago, and obtained from the federal court a judgment that prohibits or
requires certain conduct. As market dynamics change, that final judgment may have
the perverse effect of suppressing competition. In recent years, the DOJ has
typically included a sunset provision in the proposed final judgment, whereby the
judgment automatically expires ten years after its entry. For older judgments, the
DOJ reviews them periodically, and in some instances where they have outlived
their usefulness, the DOJ has asked the court to terminate the judgment or modify
its terms. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Moves
to Modify Real Estate Consent Decree: Action Allows Consumers to Get More
Information on Discounted Real Estate Fees (June 29, 2005), http://www.
usdoj.gov/opalpr/2005/June/05 at_351.htm. The utility of all administrative
regulations having such sunset (or built-in review) provisions is less clear. For a
public choice theorist, this selection process could have the perverse anticompetitive
effect of crowding out pro-competitive or competitively neutral regulations with
anticompetitive special interest regulations. Upon renewal, the agency may lack the
political will to defend pro-competitive restraints, while special interest groups will
seek to preserve, or broaden, the anticompetitive restraints.
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and adapt, the government institutions, as part of their
competition advocacy, must investigate their impact on the
marketplace, their successes and failures, and the alternatives to
250
existing deficient legal norms.
3.

How a Vibrant Marketplace of Ideas Can Promote
Competition

In promoting a competitive media, legal institutions, in turn,
promote the objectives of competition policy. 25 1
First, a
competitive media increases political accountability and reduces
corruption, which poisons any competition policy. 252 The federal
250 To achieve greater accountability, one should also inquire to what extent the

electoral rules or process create entry barriers for new candidates or political parties
and disenfranchise certain voters or hinder potential candidates. For example,
supporters of the Seventeenth Amendment argued that direct elections of U.S.
senators rather than state legislatures, would result in "cleaner, less corrupt
government and would counter the undue effects of large corporations, monopolies,
trusts, and other special-interest groups in the Senate election process." AKHIL REED
AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION 412 (2005).
251 The
"marketplace of ideas" is "a sphere in which intangible
values.., compete for acceptance." See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED 1383 (Philip Babcock Gove
ed., 1993). Its beneficial social value is based on the theory that truth prevails in the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(stating that the theory of the Constitution, as embodied in the First Amendment, is
that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas [and] that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market"). The First Amendment promotes the marketplace of ideas by
restricting to varying degrees governmental restraints on speech. The federal
antitrust laws promote the marketplace of ideas by reaching anticompetitive private
restraints on this marketplace. See, e.g., Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. Nat'l Citizens
Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 800 n. 18 (1978) ("[A]pplication of the antitrust laws
to newspapers is not only consistent with, but is actually supportive of the values
underlying, the First Amendment."); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n,
395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than
to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government
itself or a private licensee.").
252 See WORLD BANK, supra note 32, at 105 ("Across countries there is strong
evidence that higher levels of corruption are associated with lower growth and lower
levels of per capita income."). Corruption undermines competition policy (1) as a
haphazard tax "which distorts the choice between activities and lowers the returns
to public and private investments," (2) as a barrier to entry--"[e]vidence from
transition[al] economies indicates that... small firms and new entrants were
significantly more likely to report corruption as an obstacle to business"-and (3) by
subverting the "legitimacy of the state" and its ability "to provide institutions that
support markets." Id. at 106. "Corruption is also associated with lower public
spending on health and education, which in turn limits opportunities for poor people
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government can prosecute corruption by the state agencies,
which can prosecute local authorities. But who prosecutes the
federal government?
The state typically cannot investigate
corruption of a federal agency. This is left to Congress and to the
Attorney General. If the same political party controls Congress
and a weak Attorney General, that oversight is diminished. The
only remaining critical check on corruption and bad policymaking
by the federal government is the media. And who acts as a check
on the media, but competition.
An independent and competitive media (1) informs policy
makers of the unintended social effects of their policies,
(2) provides a voice to pressure the government for change, 253 and
(3) serves as a catalyst for institutional change to promote
competition policy. The World Bank found that corruption is
lower in countries that are more open to internal trade and have
a free press. 254 In countries with media monopolies, the World
Bank reported, "political, economic, and social outcomes are
worse than in those where the media are competitive, in part
because the former are less effective in improving institutional
quality (governance). 255 Given the media's important role, any
sound competition policy must include fostering a competitive
marketplace of ideas. 256 This means first keeping the media
independent and free from governmental control. As the World
Bank noted, "[h]igher levels of perceived media freedom or
independence are associated with lower levels of perceived

to invest in their human capital and to participate in markets." Id. To increase
transparency of such corruption, one non-profit company collects from businesses
"information about the official or quasi-official entities-governments, international
organizations, security forces, state-owned enterprises, etc.-around the world that
solicit bribes." Bribeline: Business Registry for International Bribery and Extortion,
Incident Reporting, https://www.bribeline.org/bribelineHome.jsp (last visited Mar.
30, 2008).
253 "A study in India found that the media affected how the government
responded to floods and famines: the distribution of relief was greater in states with
higher newspaper circulations." WORLD BANK, supra note 32, at 19; see also Robert
D. Putnam, The Strange Disappearance of Civic America, AM. PROSPECT, Nov.
30, 2002, available at http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?articleld=4972 (finding a
positive correlation between newspaper readership and civic involvement, such as
association membership).
254 WORLD BANK, supra note 32, at 19, 107.
255 Id. at 188.
256 For a survey of various nations' approaches to media mergers, see ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., MEDIA MERGERS 16 (2003), http://www.oecd.org/data
oecd/l5/3/17372985.pdf.
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corruption, regardless of differences in a country's level of
income.,257
Given traditional media's high fixed costs and significant
entry barriers, 258 however, many countries have argued for
organizing the media as a government-owned monopoly. 259 But
state ownership has its perils. 2 60 As one World Bank study
found, media in countries with high levels of state ownership
were much less free, as they transmit much less information to
people in economic and political markets. State ownership was
also found to be negatively correlated with economic, political,
and social outcomes: There was generally "more corruption,
inferior economic governance, less-developed financial markets,
fewer political rights for citizens, and poorer social outcomes in
261
education and health."
Concentrated private media ownership also hinders
competition. Private owners associated with the state or political
parties--or protecting their business interest--can shape or
control the dissemination of information. 262 An underlying
WORLD BANK, supra note 32, at 182.
258 Television, cable, and radio have regulatory barriers and high fixed costs.
Newspapers have high fixed "first copy" costs. Publishing the first copy of a
newspaper is high, given the reporting and editorial costs, the infrastructure to print
newspapers, and costs to solicit advertisers. The marginal cost of producing the
second, third, and fourth copies is very low and remains low up to the newspaper's
printing capacity. See id. at 183.
259 See id.
260 Examining the ownership structure of the five largest newspapers and
television stations in each of ninety-seven countries, the World Bank found that
state ownership was "pervasive." Id. On average, the state controlled about thirty
percent of the top five newspapers, sixty percent of the top five television stations,
and seventy-two percent of the largest radio stations. Id.
261 Id.
at 184-85 (noting also that after Mexico privatized its broadcasting in
1989, the TV station uncovered government corruption scandals and other stories
previously unreported by the state-owned station).
262 The FCC reportedly ordered its staff to destroy all copies of a draft study
that suggested greater media concentration would hurt local television news. Based
on a review of 10,500 clips from local news programs broadcast in twenty markets,
two FCC economists found that locally-owned television stations produced more
local news-about five and one-half minutes of local news per half-hour programthan non-locally-owned stations. See John Dunbar, FCC Quashed ContraryReports:
Research Supported Notion that Local Ownership of TV Stations Strengthened News,
257

RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 26, 2007, at A4. The study's finding was at odds

with the FCC, which was under heavy lobbying from the broadcast industry that
media ownership rules were too restrictive and should be loosened. In a meeting
with their supervisor, the FCC economists were told that "'the front office wasn't
going to let it out, and the bureau chief wasn't going to let it out.'" Id. Another
reportedly suppressed FCC radio study indicated that over seven years there had
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concern of media concentration is self-censorship. 263 The recent
debate surrounding News Corporation's acquisition of the Wall
Street Journal focused in part on how Rupert Murdoch shapes
the type of coverage-or, in particular in China, the lack of
coverage-in his media empire, and the need for some
mechanism to preserve the Journal's journalistic independence.
If the media is dependent upon government funding 264 or a few
major advertisers through overall industry concentration, the
265
risk of self-censorship also increases.
been a 35 percent decline in the number of radio station owners, and that 70 percent
of advertising revenue in markets that were examined was controlled by two firms.
The Senate, during its confirmation hearings, questioned the incoming FCC
Chairman about this self-censorship, and the FCC thereafter posted drafts of the
local news study and a copy of the radio study. Overseas, a study of television
coverage of the Ukrainian presidential elections among the incumbent and six other
candidates found that the percentage of coverage devoted to the incumbent and the
percentage of positive coverage that the incumbent received were directly and
positively related to the degree of state involvement in the station ownership.
Despite the legal requirement for the state-owned media to provide balanced and
neutral coverage, the state-owned station gave the most coverage (51 percent) and
the most biased coverage (75 percent of the coverage was positive for the
incumbent). Close on the heels was the private family-owned station with links to
the government (48.5 percent coverage for the incumbent, 73 percent of which was
positive). The more independent privately-owned station devoted 23 percent of its
coverage to the incumbent, 40 percent of which was positive. WORLD BANK, supra
note 32, at 185.
263 See, e.g., BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (6th ed. 2000); C. EDWIN
BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND DEMOCRACY: WHY OWNERSHIP MATTERS
(2006); ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY: COMMUNICATION
POLITICS IN DUBIOUS TIMES 243 (1999). Journalists and media watchdogs have also

expressed concern about the
independence following the
Lieberman, You Can't Report
May/June 2000, at 44, 44-49;

rise of self-censorship and the loss of journalistic
increasing media concentration. See, e.g., Trudy
What You Don't Pursue, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
Mark Crispin Miller, Can Viacom's Reporters Cover

Viacom's Interests?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,

Nov.JDec.

1999, at 50, 50. In

enacting the 1992 Cable Act, Congress noted its "special concerns" about
concentration of the media in the hands of a few who may control the dissemination
of information. One concern was that "the media gatekeepers will (1) slant
information according to their own biases, or (2) provide no outlet for unorthodox or
unpopular speech because it does not sell well, or both." Congress's second concern
about "horizontal concentration is that it can be the basis of anticompetitive acts.
For example, a market that is dominated by one buyer of a product, a monopsonist,
does not give the seller any of the benefits of competition." S. REP. NO. 102-92, at
32-33 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1165-66. Congress sought to
remedy these concerns in the 1992 Cable Act, with several provisions including the
"must-carry," "subscriber limits," and "channel occupancy" provisions.
264 See WORLD BANK, supra note 32, at 188.
265 In a survey of journalists, editors, and news executives in the United States,
"more than one-third responded that news is not reported if it might hurt
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To foster a competitive media, the government should first
reduce the media's
regulations that
onerous
remove
independence or distort the provision of information. Globally,
some government licensing requirements extend beyond
technical feasibility and impose restrictions on content. 266 After
the Korean government, for example, replaced the newspaper
licensing requirements in 1987 with more liberal ones, "the
number of newspapers grew from 6 to 17 in Seoul alone, and
dozens more were launched" in other parts of Korea, providing
267
more diverse coverage.
The government should also affirmatively promote the free
flow of information.
Under an evolutionary economic
perspective, not only is experimentation critical, but also the
dissemination of information of that experimentation and
feedback thereto. 268
Given the dispersion of information in
society and the attendant search costs, the government can play
a key role in facilitating "the greatest possible centralization of
information, and diffusion of it from the centre." 269 This does not
mean having the government evaluate or filter the information's
content.
Instead, the government should promote the
information's transparency.2 7 0
These steps include creating
advertising revenues and thus harm the financial position of media firms." Id.
266 One notable example is the Chinese government's attempt to restrict access
to or chill certain information over the Internet. Residents of the city Xiamen
recently employed the Internet to organize a mass protest against a planned
chemical feedstock plant. Seeking to mitigate the anonymity of Internet users, city
officials drafted regulations banning such anonymous postings. See Mure Dickie,
Chinese City To Tighten Grip over Internet, FIN. TIMES (London), July 9, 2007.
Internet censorship, according to one report, is practiced in about twenty-four
countries, with ten countries "regularly preventing their citizens from seeing a range
of material" online. Also disturbing is that other countries reportedly are copying the
more experienced countries' censorship techniques. See Richard Waters, Web
Censorship Spreading Around the World, Report Finds, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar.
15, 2007, at 1. These censorship techniques include (1) the "brute force" bombarding
of the offending server with requests, so as to make the website unobtainable,
(2) blocking entire services, such as Google's blogging service, and (3) keyword
filtering which identifies particular undesirable terms. See id. The World Bank cites
two additional techniques: (1) "restrict[ing] access to the Internet under criminal
law," or (2) "establish[ing] government Internet service monopolies" to restrict
citizens' access to certain sites and to "monitorn information from abroad." WORLD
BANK, supra note 32, at 187.
267 WORLD BANK, supranote 32, at 186.
268 NELSON & WINTER, supra note 109, at 402; see also Moreau, supra note 49,
at 869.
269 MILL, supra note 245, at 123.
270 For example, the government can promote benchmarks so that consumers
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antitrust safe harbors for private individuals to (1) publicly
disseminate price, wage, and other information, 27 1 or (2) promote
novel forms of information dissemination, such as prediction
markets, whereby individuals bet on future outcomes. 272 To
foster accountability-and lower the media's search costs-the
government can promote its own transparency and remove
273
restraints in accessing such information.
Finally, in the media industry, the competition agencies
should examine not only the merger's-or anticompetitive
restraint's-impact on advertising rates, but its impact on
editorial competition. 274 Although some argue that editorial
competition involves non-economic concerns better left to other
agencies, such editorial competition, as courts have repeatedly
found, is economic competition cognizable under the competition
laws.

2 75

can readily compare prices of goods, such as mattresses and cell phone services. In

markets with many sellers, buyers may have high search costs to identify the
lowest-priced seller. Increased price transparency may make it easier for buyers to
compare prices and bargain shop, reducing their search costs.
271 Making historical price, supply, or cost data may also enable each competitor
to benchmark its performance to an industry standard. For such exchanges, the
federal antitrust agencies have outlined some steps to mitigate litigation risks by
(1) having a third party, such as a purchaser, government agency, consultant,
academic institution, or trade association, collect the data, (2) basing the
information provided by the participants on data more than three months old,
(3) having at least five providers report data upon which each disseminated statistic
is based, with no individual provider's data representing more than 25 percent on a
weighted basis of that statistic, and (4) aggregating any information disseminated
such that it would not allow recipients to identify the prices charged or
compensation paid by any particular provider. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED.
TRADE COMM'N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE

63 (1996), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0O00.pdf; see also Letter from
R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., to Diana
West, Internationally Bd.-Certified Lactation Consultant (May 25, 2004),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/203831.pdf (explaining that the Division
would not challenge the collection of fee information for a survey among competitors,
which would be collected following the principles outlined in the Health Care
Guidelines). For a further discussion of the antitrust risks of the dissemination of
price information, see generally Maurice E. Stucke, Evaluating the Risks of
IncreasedPrice Transparency, 19 ANTITRUST 81 (2005).
272 See KENNETH J. ARROW ET AL., AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CTR., STATEMENT ON
PREDICTION MARKETS 2 (2007) (on file with author).
273 The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 2008), for example,

was enacted to foster this transparency. For a critique of its success and
shortcomings in recent years, see generally ALASDAIR ROBERTS, BLACKED OUT:
GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2006).
274
275

See Stucke & Grunes, supra note 173, at 270-73.
The most recent decision was Reilly v. MediaNews Group, Inc., No. C 06-
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How Ethical, Social, and Moral Norms Can Promote and
Hinder Competition

Competitive markets are not supported solely by government
institutions. Individuals act or refrain from acting based on
individual, familial, social, religious, and ethical norms.
Competition advocates must do more than establish the basic
rules of the game to "ensure that each firm's competitive energy
is directed towards socially-productive ends rather than sociallydestructive or welfare-reducing ends. 2 76
They must also
synthesize these rules with the prevailing informal cultural,
moral, and ethical norms. 277 These norms can act as sticks-such
as guilt, shame, social stigma, or economic or penal sanctions-or
as carrots-such as praise or increased social stature.27 8 The key
for competition policymakers is determining how these informal
institutions aid or hinder competition, such as by facilitating
27 9
market transactions or collusion.
Moral norms and competition policy, rather than being
antithetical, can work in tandem toward shared goals by
removing entry barriers against outsiders or targets of
discrimination, fostering non-zero-sum cooperation and strong

04322 SI, 2007 WL 1068202, at *3 (N.D. Ca. Apr. 10, 2007), where Judge Illston held
that the alleged loss of editorial competition was sufficient for antitrust injury. See
also Hawaii v. Gannett Pac. Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1249-50 (D. Haw.), affd,
203 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1999); Cmty. Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp.
1146, 1166 (W.D. Ark. 1995), aff'd, 139 F.3d 1180 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Citizen Publ'g Co., 280 F. Supp. 978, 985 (D. Ariz. 1968), affid, 394 U.S. 131 (1969);
United States v. Times Mirror Co., 274 F. Supp. 606, 612 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd, 390
U.S. 712 (1968).
276 OECD, REGULATED SECTORS, supra note 133, at 3.
277 As a FTC Commissioner observed on his trip to Mongolia, even if a former
centrally-panned economy relaxes controls on firm behavior, "some business entities
may show a propensity to attempt to recreate privately the types of planning
mechanisms that the state formerly supplied." William E. Kovacic, Designing and
Implementing Competition and Consumer Protection Reforms in Transitional
Economies: Perspectives from Mongolia, Nepal, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe, 44 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1197, 1205 (1995). Likewise, two French economists attributed-before the
election of President Nicolas Sarkozy-their country's anti-capitalist instincts and
resistance to change to attribution bias. When France was interventionist in the
1950s and 60s, growth was high, so people thereafter attribute growth to
interventionism. See AUGUSTIN LANDIER & DAVID THESMAR, LE GRAND MtCHANT
MARCHE (2007).
278 For a discussion of the use of shaming and praise to deter antitrust crime,
see generally Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, 2006 COLUM. Bus. L. REV.
443, 515-23 (2006) [hereinafter Stucke, Morality and Antitrust].
279 See WORLD BANK, supra note 32, at 173.
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reciprocity, and increasing opportunities for technological change
by opening access to the market. Absent promoting these ethical
and moral foundations for competition, competition policies can
stumble. As the chief rabbi of Britain said,
[w]hen everything that matters can be bought and sold, when
commitments can be broken because they are no longer to our
advantage, when shopping becomes salvation and advertising
slogans become our litany, when our worth is measured by how
the
much we earn and spend, then the market is 28destroying
0
very virtues on which in the long run it depends.
For example, until the Sentencing Guidelines were
promulgated, the federal district courts treated price-fixing and
other hard-core cartels lightly, infrequently sentencing offenders
to jail.28 1 Even today in most countries, the existing legal, social,
and ethical norms do not condemn such price-fixing. 28 2 A country
can introduce criminal sanctions for such hard-core cartels, but
absent social condemnation, the risk of jury or judge nullification
increases. To deter such price-fixing, competition authorities
must reorient these informal norms by educating the public to
the harms of the criminalized conduct. Once citizens synthesize
the legal norm with the prevailing social, ethical, and moral
norms-and internalize that norm-the costs to police and
punish deviations thereto are reduced. Absent reconciliation
with prevailing social, ethical, and moral norms, legal
prohibitions are costly to enforce and face jury and judge
Enforcement authorities can supplement the
nullification.
criminal sanctions of incarceration and fines with shaming and
praise. 28 3 Moreover, internalizing the norms not only helps deter
price-fixing-without the need to escalate the levels of
incarceration-but also helps foster a culture of competition.
Social, ethical, and moral norms can complement, but not
supplant, legal institutions to foster competition. Social, ethical,
and moral norms may work well in insular communities where
trade is based upon shared conventions and personal
relationships. Deviations are subject to social penalties. For
example, at a local yard sale, I may accept a check from my
280 JONATHAN

SACKS,

To
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FRACTURED

WORLD:

RESPONSIBILITY (2005).
281 Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, supra note 278, at 460-70.
282 Id. at 540-44.
283 See id. at 515-23.
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neighbor. But this informal norm of trust-and the social stigma
if the neighbor's check bounces-weakens when I trade over eBay
with someone outside my community. Moreover, outsiders may
be uninformed of--or do not share-the local norms of exchanges,
Here, formal legal
which may serve as a trade barrier.
institutions can supplement the informal norms to encourage
trade with more socio-culturally diverse traders. One key legal
mechanism to lower the risk of transactions is to promote
information sharing. 28 4 As division of labor increases, we become
more dependent upon others to provide our goods and services.
As the complexity of our relationships increases-getting
vegetables from South America, shoes and eyeglasses from Italy,
and much else from China-legal institutions must supplement
Otherwise, absent these legal
these informal institutions.
institutions, transaction costs and allocative inefficiency
28 5
increase.
On the other hand, informal norms can hinder the
attainment of competition goals. Social norms, for example, can
insulate certain groups from competition through discriminatory
practices. Legal institutions can break down these entry barriers
and improve competitiveness by enabling the discriminated
groups to compete in the marketplace. 28 6 Social norms, especially
284 Rather than taking the most risk-averse position-such as demanding cash
up front, extracting higher service fees, or requiring a performance bond, surety, or
guarantor-a more formal mechanism to collect information can assist traders in
gaining information about the riskiness, reputation, and ethics of their potential
partners, and adjust accordingly. One simple example is the reputation feedback of
traders over eBay. As these more formal norms are manipulated, as some have
found over eBay, alternative or supplemental legal institutions might be required.
285 In countries
without developed legal institutions, for example, the
contracting parties must negotiate all the contingencies, remedies, and procedural
due process components. As the community legal institutions develop, the parties
need not replicate this entire legal framework in every contract. Indeed, the contract
can focus on the material, unique issues; the remainder can be left to default or
implied provisions.
286 For example, anti-discrimination laws can spur competition by enabling
individuals of different race, gender, origin, sexual orientation, religion, or age to
compete in the labor market and for goods and services. Thus, an important
component of competition policy is breaking down these entry barriers, promoting
greater access to these markets-such as for housing, schooling, government,
employment, etc.-as well as educating society to the anticompetitive harms of such
discriminatory practices. The persistence of racial discrimination also undercuts the
neoclassical economist's assumption that market forces will somehow discipline
discriminatory employers and eliminate discrimination from the marketplace.
Needless to say that if the market is the solution to discrimination, it
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during times of economic stagnation, may lead to hostility toward
immigrants. The orthodoxy is that global trade flourishes by
reducing tariffs and other trade barriers, encouraging
convergence on competition policies, and otherwise promoting the
free flow of goods and services across borders. It is puzzling that,
in recent years, the United States seeks to liberalize trade while
erecting barriers for professionals, students, and potential
employees from entering the United States. 28 7 It is also puzzling
that attorneys (myself included) at the Antitrust Division of the
DOJ spent time and resources on unrelated immigration
appeals-namely, defending the deportation of immigrants who
sought amnesty in the United States. How can a competition
agency promoting open information exchanges and trade seek to
erect such entry barriers, and what sort of signal does a
competition agency send when its attorneys are clamping down
on workers seeking amnesty to remain in the United States?
This is not to say that immigration should be unregulated. But,
any intelligent competition policy must assess the degree to
which immigration norms-as well as resources devoted to
enforcing such norms-promote or hinder the objectives of our
competition policies, including the presumption that our nation's
28 8
openness to immigrants has spurred its competitiveness.
seems to take a distressingly long time to solve the problem since the
market has had well over one hundred years to work since the passage of
the Thirteenth Amendment and discrimination is still with us today.
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Economics and Sociology: The Prospects for an
InterdisciplinaryDiscourseon Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 389, 409-10 (1997).
287 About eighty percent of MBA programs launched over the past ten years
were outside the United States. Although this may reflect a mature domestic market
for MBAs, the "application problem has been exacerbated by visa time lags and the
unfriendliness of American authorities to non-U.S. entrants after the events of
September 11, 2001." James M. Danko, The Global MBA Race: Facing Challenges
Through Collaboration,Bus. LEADERSHIP REV., July 2005, http://schools.mbaworld.

com/printblrarticle/29/index.htm.
288 John Stuart Mill commented about internal trade fostering the exchange of
ideas, stating that:
[T]he economical advantages of commerce are surpassed in importance by
those of its effects which are intellectual and moral. It is hardly possible to
overrate the value, for the improvement of human beings, of things which
bring them into contact with persons dissimilar to themselves, and with
modes of thought and action unlike those with which they are familiar.
Commerce is now, what war once was, the principal source of this contact.
Commercial adventurers from more advanced countries have generally
been the first civilizers of barbarians. And commerce is the purpose of the
far greater part of the communication which takes place between civilized
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Similarly, great leaders temper rather than excite their citizens'
fears about foreigners during times of uncertainty. Although
Athens was at war, for example, Pericles in his funeral oration
noted Athens' strength in throwing open its city to the world:
"[N]ever by alien acts" does Athens "exclude foreigners from any
opportunity of learning or observing, although the eyes of an
enemy may occasionally profit by our liberality." 28 9 As this last
point reinforces, policy makers must examine how their moral
and ethical norms affect the goals of competition. How effective
are authorities in promoting a culture of competition, if, for
example, they violate the rule of law? Ultimately, policy makers
must provide moral leadership.
5.

How Informed Antitrust Enforcement Can Promote
Competition
Finally, for effective competition advocacy, authorities must
identify not only the objectives of their competition policy, but the
risks when market power is left unchecked.
Competition
advocacy rings hollow without antitrust enforcement. Instead of
viewing competition enforcement and advocacy as independent
activities, the ICN noted how they reinforce each other:
"Enforcement is strengthened by an active advocacy, and
advocacy is less effective in the absence of enforcement powers or
when enforcement lacks credibility." 290 This does not mean more
nations. Such communication has always been, and is peculiarly in the
present age, one of the primary sources of progress. To a being like man,
who, as hitherto educated, can scarcely cultivate even a good quality
without running it into a fault, it is indispensable to be perpetually
comparing his own notions and customs with the experience and example of
persons in different circumstances from himself: and there is no nation
which does not need to borrow from others, not merely particular arts or
practices, but essential points of character in which its own type is
inferior .... And it may be said without exaggeration that the great extent
and rapid increase of international trade, in being the principal guarantee
of the peace of the world, is the great permanent security for the
uninterrupted progress of the ideas, the institutions, and the character of
the human race.
JOHN STUART MILL, 1 PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 119-20 (West Strand
1848).
289 THE LANDMARK THUCYDIDES, supra note 231, at 113. Sparta, in contrast,
regularly and summarily expelled unwelcomed visitors. Id. app. C.
290 ICN ADVOCACY REPORT, supra note 1, at iv; see also Porter, supra note 93, at
156 (noting his conviction that "open competition, stimulated by strict antitrust
enforcement, is essential not only to national prosperity, but to the health of

companies themselves"). See generally HARVARD UNIV. & WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE
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of the same mishmash of neoclassical economic theory, vignettes
of zero-sum competition, and normative weighing of the
anticompetitive ethereal-deadweight welfare loss-against the
conjectures of procompetitive efficiencies. This recipe benefits
antitrust lawyers acting as soothsayers, but is a disservice to
industry participants, competition authorities entrusted with
enforcing the law, and consumers.
Instead, competition
enforcement must become more empirically based, objective, and
291
predictable.
IV. How Do WE KNOW WE ARE PROGRESSING IN THE RIGHT
DIRECTION

If competition is a process to achieve certain objectives, how
do we know if we are progressing toward that end?
If
competition is not a self-initiating, self-correcting process that
ultimately guides us to the right result, then there is no
assurance that the invisible hand is bringing about concomitant
moral progress. Nor is it clear that competition, even if selfinitiating, independently promotes moral, ethical, and societal
objectives.
Competition policymakers must periodically assess the
economy's progression toward the competition policy's objectives.
Concepts like consumer welfare or allocative or productive
efficiency are not readily measurable, and therein the potential
for abuse exists: An ethereal objective can justify any practice.
Instead, competition authorities must justify their policies by
29 2
more tangible signposts.
The AMC recently cited two familiar, but unmeasureable,
objectives of a competitive market: (1) spurring "businesses to
develop and sell as efficiently as possible the kinds and quality of
goods and services that consumers desire,"293 and (2) driving an
"economy's resources toward their fullest and most efficient uses,

GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2000 (2000).
291 For a discussion of several measures to

improve merger enforcement, see
generally Stucke, Behavioral Economists, supra note 69, at 579-82. I plan to further
develop this subject in a forthcoming article, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the
Rule of Law?.
292 Plutarch similarly employed certain signposts to objectify one's moral
development. PLUTARCH, On Being Aware of Moral Progress, in ESSAYS 130 (Ian
Kidd ed., Robin H. Waterfield trans., Penguin 1992).
293 AMC REPORT, supra note 18, at 333.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

1032

[Vol. 82:951

thereby providing a basis for economic development." 294 Only the
third signpost has some measurability: leading to the "creation of
wealth, making possible improved living standards and greater
295
prosperity.
What happens, however, if one signpost reflects a stagnant
or declining living standard and a growing wealth disparity? In
perfectly competitive markets, producers are price takers and
charge less than what many consumers are willing to pay. Many
factors contribute to the inequality of wealth, but any
competition policy must assess its impact on wealth distribution.
Market power reduces consumer surplus, as wealth is
transferred from buyers to sellers. 296 A historical criticism of
utilitarian welfare economics is its indifference to such
distributional issues, and "its concentration only on utility sumtotals in a distribution-blind way."297 Although neoclassical
economic theory may be indifferent to such distributional effects,
one concern underlying the Sherman Act's passage in 1890 was
the growing disparity in wealth.
With business executives
"madly striving in the race for riches," a widening income
294

Id.

295

Id.

296 For example, assume loyal Coca-Cola ("Coke") drinkers are willing to pay one

dollar for a twelve-ounce can; but other cola buyers are willing to drink either Coke
or Pepsi depending on which is cheaper. Because the vending machine cannot
ascertain the loyalty of prospective purchasers, and charge the loyal Coke drinkers
more than the fickle drinkers, Coke charges a lower price to capture the sales of the
marginal Coke beverage drinkers. In a perfectly competitive market, the price for
the can of Coke would equal its marginal cost. But given Coke's investment in
branding and promotion, the price will be somewhat higher, say sixty cents. Thus,
the loyal Coke drinkers enjoy a consumer surplus of forty cents, which represents
the savings of what they were willing to pay-one dollar-versus what they actually
paid-sixty cents. If the Coca-Cola Company acquired PepsiCo, then it could extract
more consumer surplus through its increased market power. For example, Coca-Cola
post-merger could charge a higher price for its Coke products--one dollar-but keep
Pepsi at a lower price-sixty cents. Now the loyal Coke drinker has zero consumer
surplus. On one level, wealth is being transferred from the loyal consumers to Coke.
On a second level, not all Coke employees, shareholders or other stakeholders will
equally share in these monopoly rents. Depending on the clout of Coke's workers,
shareholders, or other stakeholders, these monopoly rents may ultimately be
dissipated on a subset of Coke stakeholders, such as their senior executives. Indeed,
the average CEO compensation in the United States has increased much faster than
the average wage, which cannot be attributed solely to tax episodes in the 1980s. See
infra note 302.
297 Amartya Sen, The Possibility of Social Choice, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 349, 352
(1999). When receiving his Nobel prize, Sen noted this informational limitation of
the distributional effects has "considerable ethical and political importance." Id.

2008]

BETTER COMPETITIONADVOCACY

1033

disparity emerged: "[o]ne comprising the very rich and powerful,
while in another are found the toiling poor." 298 Likewise, Senator
Sherman identified this inequality of condition, of wealth, and
opportunity as the greatest threat to disturbing social order:
This inequality "has grown within a single generation out of the
concentration of capital into vast combinations to control
29 9
production and trade and to break down competition."
The disparity in income, based on the index of income
concentration or Gini coefficient, decreased between 1947 and
1968, but increased thereafter, accelerating notably during the
Reagan Administration, which, outside of localized bid-rid
rigging schemes, had severely cut back its antitrust
enforcement. 30 0 According to another measure, the disparity in
wealth in recent years is higher than when the Sherman Act was
promulgated. 30 1 Other measures show the ever-widening salary
gap between the average CEO and the average worker, 30 2 and
between the richest one percent and the average worker. 30 3 The
298

President Grover Cleveland, Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1888), in 1 THE

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES

57, 58 (Earl W. Kintner ed., 1978).
299 21 CONG. REC. 2455, 2460 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman), reprintedin 1
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED

STATUTES 113, 122 (Earl W. Kintner ed., 1978).
300 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE CHANGING SHAPE OF THE NATION'S INCOME

DISTRIBUTION 1947-1998 (2000). The census data may understate the income
disparity. See Peter H. Lindert, When Did Inequality Rise in Britainand America?, 9
J. INCOME DISTRIBUTION 11, 13 (2000). Other studies reflect the growing income

disparity. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United
States: 1913-1998, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1, 1 (2003).
301 See Lindert, supra note 300, at 18.
302 In 2005, according to an Economic Policy Institute study, the average CEO in
the United States earned 262 times the pay of the average worker, the secondhighest level of this ratio in the forty years for which data exist. In 1965, U.S. CEOs
in major companies earned twenty-four times more than an average worker; this
ratio grew to thirty-five in 1978 and to seventy-one in 1989. The ratio hit 300 at the
end of the recovery in 2000. The fall in the stock market reduced CEO stock-related
pay, such as options, and the ratio declined to 143 times that of an average worker
in 2002. "Since then, however, CEO pay has exploded and by 2005 the average CEO
was paid $10,982,000 a year, or 262 times that of an average worker ($41,861)," and
a CEO earned more in one workday than an average worker earned in fifty-two
weeks. Lawrence Mishel, CEO-to-Worker Pay Imbalance Grows, ECON. SNAPSHOTS

(Econ. Policy Inst., Wash., D.C.), June 21, 2006, http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/
webfeatures_snapshots_20060621. In examining the widening income disparity in
the United States, Piketty and Saez found that since 1970, the increasing CEO
compensation could not be attributed solely to tax episodes in the 1980s or of
technical change in the United States. Piketty & Saez, supra note 300, at 32, 34.
303 The Economic Policy Institute measured the ratio of the wealth of the richest
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traditional response is to invest in educating skilled workers.
But how does one reconcile another signpost that the earnings of
the average United States worker with an undergraduate degree
have not kept up with the gains in productivity in recent
304
years?
Besides wealth disparity, crime is another signpost of
whether competition is progressing toward its intended goals.
Thomas More, for example, noted how a sheep cartel fueled by
the "wicked greed of a few men" caused great evil. As wool prices
escalated, poorer people who ordinarily made cloth out of the
wool could not afford to buy it and, therefore, were unemployed
and reduced to idleness and crime. 30 5 Unless the evils of
monopolies and oligopolies were remedied, warned More's
traveler in Utopia, "It is pointless for you to boast of the justice
administered in the punishment of thieves, a justice which is
specious rather than either just or expedient."30 6 Crime may be a
function of the comparable unattractiveness
of lawful
employment. What does one make of the United States' prison
population being the highest per capita in the world, and of the
7
large number of homicides for a developed country?3 0

one percent to that of a household with typical wealth in the middle, and found that
the wealth inequality has not only persisted, but widened over time. "The richest 1%
of wealth holders had 125 times the wealth of the typical household in 1962; by 2004
they had 190 times as much or $14.8 million in wealth for the upper 1% compared to
just $82,000 for the household in the middle fifth of wealth." Sylvia Allegretto,
Wealth Inequality Is Vast and Growing, ECON. SNAPSHOTS (Econ. Policy Inst.,
Wash., D.C.), Aug. 23, 2006, http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/webfeaturessnapshots_
20060823.
304 See Frank S. Levy & Peter Temin, Inequality and Institutions in 20th
Century America (MIT Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 07-17, 2007),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=984330 (presenting a comprehensive view of the income
distribution by contrasting conditions in postwar years); see also Krishna Guha &
Alex Barker, US Graduates Are Not Immune to Income Inequality, FIN. TIMES
(London), June 5, 2007 (discussing Mr. Levy's and Mr. Temin's research).
305 THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA 24-25 (Clarence H. Miller trans., Yale Univ. Press
2001) (1516).
306

Id. at 25.

See Stephen Fidler, US and Russia Make a Poor Showing in Peace Rankings,
FIN. TIMES (London), May 31, 2007 (discussing the United States' poor peace rank).
There was some concern about England's and Wales' prison population, which in
1993 increased from 45,000 to 80,000, more than at any time in Britain's history.
But, while Britain has 148 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants, the United States is
approximately five times higher: 748 per 100,000 inhabitants. Richard Tomkins, The
Case for the Prosecution,FIN. TIMES (London), May 18, 2007.
307
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Other signposts may call into question whether America's
competition policies are trending in the right direction, including:
"
The comparative weakness in the area of health and
primary education, where the United States ranked
40th overall in the competitive index, below most
countries at similar per capita income levels.
"

Weak health indicators compared with other wealthy
nations, such as lower life expectancy, higher infant
mortality rates than in countries such as Japan,
Finland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and Korea, and
high prevalence rate for HIV/AIDS-placing the United
States 79th in the world-despite the fact that at almost
15 percent of GDP, the United States spends more on
health care than any other nation in the worldincluding France and Germany (10 and 11 percent of
GDP, respectively) where health coverage, unlike that in
the United States, is universal.

"

International
concern
over
the
macroeconomic
imbalances in the United States, particularly public
308
finances.

CONCLUSION
Advocating competition must be more than attacking
anticompetitive government restraints that protect German
economists, Italian hairstylists, and Kentucky real estate agents.
In advocating competition, policy makers cannot surmise that:
(1) free market forces are generally self-correcting and selfinitiating, (2) absent governmental restraints, the free market
will allocate resources efficiently, (3) the government is an
exogenous force to be used sparingly for sustained market
failure, (4) the government can do more harm than good, so the
risk of false positives is greater than of false negatives,
308 WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2006-2007,
at 30 (2006).
These indicators suggest that Americans receive worse health care than do

the citizens of many countries that spend less, eroding the country's overall
competitiveness. Implementation of the long-discussed health care reforms
in the country should therefore be seen as a priority for improving the
country's competitiveness in the future.
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(5) government bureaucrats are so susceptible to regulatory
capture that the goals of competition policy, once inoculated from
politics, will be value-free efficiency and consumer welfare, and
(6) competition advocacy should focus on hard-core restraints
done under the state action doctrine and other implied or express
antitrust immunities.
Competition policy makers must step back and clearly
articulate: (1) what they mean by competition, (2) its specific
objectives, (3) how their policies will achieve those objectives,
(4) what institution-building is necessary to promote such
competition, besides governmental restraints that inhibit the
attainment of such competitive state/process, (5) whether
governmental inaction-such as inadequate institutions or lax
antitrust enforcement policy in particular areas-inhibits the
attainment of such competitive state/process, and (6) how they
will keep us apprised with measurable signposts to ensure that
we are indeed heading in the right direction. Rather than being
an idealized state, competition instead is a process with which to
achieve certain objectives. Inquiring about the objectives of
competition policy, the means to attain that end, the role of legal
and informal institutions to assist toward that end, and our
progression should be the critical exercises that lead to more
informed advocacy.

